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The Function of the Preliminary Hearing
in Federal Pretrial Procedure*
There has been considerable debate in recent years over the causes
and effects of the significant delay in the American criminal justice
system between arrest and trial.' Differing views as to the nature of the
problem of delay have led to different proposals for reform.2 One espe-
cially controversial reform proposal which has received considerable
public exposure is legislative enforcement of the right to a speedy
trial.3 The public discussion of this proposal has heretofore ignored
a less drastic alternative which could secure at a significantly lesser
cost some of the advantages which proponents of speedy trial reforms
seek to achieve for the benefit of the accused, the prosecution, and
0 The basic conceptual models developed in this Note, as well as the respective
designations for the two models, were first suggested to the author by Dean Abraham
S. Goldstein of the Yale Law School. His contribution and assistance are gratefully
acknowledged.
1. See Hearings on S. 754 Before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-10, 109-31, 140-44, 154-64 (1973)
[hereinafter cited as 1973 Hearings]; Hearings on S. 895 Before the Subcomm. on
Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-15,
24-38, 73-86, 94-121 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971 Hearings]; Note, Speedy Trial: A
Constitutional Right in Search of Definition, 61 GEo. L... 657, 661-68 (1973); 118
CONG. REC. S14,747 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1972); cf. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAw ENFORCE-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 80-96 (1967).
See also Address by Chief Justice Burger on the State of the Federal Judiciary, American
Bar Ass'n Annual Convention, Aug. 10, 1970, reprinted in 1971 Hearings, supra, at 729.
2. Compare 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 1-15 (proposals of Senator Ervin), with id.
at 94-121 (proposals of then-Ass't Attorney General Rehnquist).
3. See S. 754, 93d Cong., Ist Sess. § 101 (1973); S. 895, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. § 101
(1971); 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 33-45. Under these proposals, all introduced by
Senator Ervin, federal prosecutors would be required in most circumstances to com-
mence trial within 60 days of indictment or arrest. Other plans designed to implement
the right to a speedy trial have involved much more flexible standards. See FED. R.
CRIM. P. 50(b) (requires each district court to establish a plan for the prompt dis-
position of criminal cases); SECOND CIRCUIT RULES REGARDING PROMPT DISPOSITION OF
CRIMINAL CASES (1971), adopted in United States ex rel. Frizer v. McMann, 437 F.2d
1312 (2d Cir. 1971) (en banc) (superseded by a "Plan for Achieving Prompt Disposition
of Criminal Cases," approved Feb. 28, 1973; effective April 1, 1973; prosecutor must
be "ready for trial" within six months of the arrest or indictment); N.Y. CODE CRIM.
PRO. §§ 30.20-.30 (McKinnev 1971) (sets specific time periods but varies those periods
depending upon the severity of the crime). The American Bar Association standards
resemble Senator Ervin's proposals more than the flexible plans. AMERICAN BAR ASS'N,
PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SPEEDY
TRIAL § 2.1, Commentary at 14-16 (tent. draft 1967).
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the criminal justice system as a whole. This alternative is reform of the
federal preliminary hearing.4
The preliminary hearing is a judicial proceeding, held shortly after
the arrest of the accused, the primary function5 of which is to deter-
mine whether there is sufficient indication that a crime has been com-
mitted by the accused to justify his further detention and to screen out
weak and unsubstantiated cases which do not justify any further atten-
tion.6 The preliminary examination is an important institution, both
4. The preliminary hearing, sometimes called the preliminary examination, should
be distinguished from the initial appearance, FED. R. CIUm. P. 5, in which immediately
after the arrest a federal magistrate sets bail and issues a complaint based on probable
cause in cases of warrantless arrests; and from arraignment, FED. R. CRI,. P. 10, in which
the accused is read the indictment before the trial court and asked to enter a plea.
5. Although historically the purpose of the hearing was to permit the prosecution
to discover and preserve evidence against the accused, see Anderson, The Preliminary
Hearing-Better Alternatives or More of the Same?, 35 Mo. L. REV. 281, 288-89 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as Alternatives]; Weinberg & Weinberg, The Congressional Invitation
to. Avoid the Preliminary Hearing: An Analysis of Section 303 of the Magistrates Act
of 1968, 67 MICH. L. REV. 1361, 1365-70 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Congressional Invi-
tation]; Note, The Preliminary Hearing-An Interest Analysis, 51 IoWA L. REv. 164, 165-
67 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Interest Analysis], the modern preliminary examination
has evolved primarily into a safeguard for the defendant by protecting him from un-
founded charges. See Alternatives, supra at 284-86; Congressional Invitation, supra at
1368-70; Interest Analysis, supra at 167.
Another purpose of the preliminary hearing is to reconsider the initial conditions
of pretrial release imposed (often mechanically) under FED. R. CraM. P. 5(c) at the
initial appearance. See Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 9 (1970).
The distinction is often drawn between the purposes of the preliminary examination
and its functions or collateral consequences. 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 5.1.02[1],
at 5.1-7 (2d ed. R. Cipes 1973); Alternatives, supra at 283. Although at one time there
was some doubt on the matter, see Blue v. United States, 342 F.2d 894, 901 (D.C. Cir.
1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 944 (1965); Note, Preliminary Hearing in the District of
Columbia-An Emerging Discovery Device, 56 GEo. L.J. 191 (1967), it is now clear that
discovery is only a collateral consequence and not a purpose of the federal preliminary
examination. See United States v. King, 482 F.2d 768, 775 (D C. Cir. 1973); Coleman v.
Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1199-1200 (D.C. Cir. 1973); United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d
47 (7th Cir. 1968), vacated on other grounds, 394 U.S. 310 (1969); Sciortino v. Zampano,
385 F.2d 132 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968); United States v. Hinkle,
307 F. Supp. 117 (D.D.C. 1969); 18 U.S.C. §§ 3060(a), (e) (1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(C)
(no preliminary examination is required if a grand jury indictment is returned); S. REP.
No. 371, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 34-35 (1967) [hereinafter cited as S. REP. No. 371].
On the actual workings of the preliminary examination, see generally the following
empirical studies: D. MCINTYRE, LAW ENFORCEMENT IN THE METROPOLIS 117-25 (1967)
(preliminary hearing in Detroit); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION 45-149 (1969) (empirical study
including Wisconsin and Michigan); P. Weinberg, Preliminary Hearing in the District
of Columbia (Institute of Criminal Law and Procedure, Georgetown Univ. Law School,
1969) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Hearing in the District of Columbia]; Graham
& Letwin. Preliminary Hearings in Los Angeles: Some Field Findings and Legal Policy
Observations, 18 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 635, 916 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Preliminary Hear-
ings in Los Angeles]; McIntyre & Lippman, Prosecutors and Early Disposition of Felony
Cases. 56 A.B.A.J. 1154, 1155-57 (1970); McIntyre, A Study of Judicial Dominance of
the Charging Process, 59 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 463 (1968); Miller & Dawson, Non-Use
of the Preliminary Examination: A Study of Current Practices, 1964 Wis. L. REV. 252
(1964); Oaks & Lehman, The Criminal Process of Cook County and the Indigent De-
fendant, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 584, 607-31 (1966 ; Theis, Preliminary Hearings in Homicide
Cases: A Hearing Delayed is a Hearing Denied, 62 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 17 (1971);
Note, Metropolitan Criminal Courts of First Instance, 70 HARV. L. REV. 320, 325-29 (1956).
6. See Myers v. Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1973); MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.1(1) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972); note 61 infra.
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because of the protection it affords the accused and because of its stra-
tegic position in the criminal justice system and intimate interrelation
with other aspects of the process-arrest, bail, prosecutorial discretion,
the grand jury, and the trial. The federal system s and each of the
fifty states" presently provide for the use of the preliminary examina-
tion in felony cases. Such unanimity of use, however, conceals im-
portant differences as to the nature of the preliminary examinations
held in those jurisdictions. These differences relate to several issues
inherent in the law of preliminary examinations.
One issue is the admissibility of evidence at the hearing, i.e., whether
the rules of evidence should apply at the hearing to exclude hearsay,
illegally obtained evidence, and other incompetent evidence. Another
issue is the evidentiary burden which the prosecution must sustain in
order to have the accused bound over for trial. The dispute centers on
whether "probable cause," which is the standard for obtaining an
7. The preliminary examination must be viewed in connection with other aspects of
the criminal process for these aspects vary among jurisdictions in ways which affect
the preliminary examination. For example, the extent to which the prosecutor plays an
active role prior to the institution of formal charges, eliminating weak cases through the
exercise of prosecutional discretion, varies among jurisdictions, see L. HALL, Y. KAI1II-
SAR, W. LEFAVE, & J. ISRAEL, MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 850-51 (3d ed. 1969); F.
MILLER, supra note 5, at 9-19, 78, 83-84; The Prel'minary Hearing in the District of
Columbia, supra note 5, at x-xi, 12, 17; McIntyre & Lippman, supra note 5; Congres-
sional Invitation, supra note 5, at 1381-82, and this variation has an effect on both
the strength and numbers of cases which reach the preliminary examination stage.
Another important variation is the grand jury. In some jurisdictions felony prosecu-
tions must be commenced by means of an indictment, see, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V;
MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 277, § 15 (1968); N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 6; N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO.
§§ 100.05, 180.10(2), 180.30 (McKinney 1971), while an information is sufficient in others,
see, e.g., ARIz. R. CRIiu. PRO. 78 (West 1956); CAL. CONST. art. I, § 8; CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 737 (West 1970); MICH. CouIP. LAws ANN. §§ 767.1-.2 (West 1963); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 967.05 (1971). If the prosecutor proceeds by indictment, the preliminary examination
may be merely an intermediate process which acts as a precursor to the grand jury
screen; if he proceeds by information, it is the final formal screen prior to trial. A
third important variant is pretrial release. Its availability determines whether the ac-
cused will be incarcerated during the period between the arrest and the preliminary
examination and, if he is bound over, during the period between the hearing and
the next stage of the process (either the grand jury or the trial). These considerations
bear both on the promptness with which a preliminary examination should be held
and the rigor or stringency of the screen which should be erected. See generally note
131 infra.
8. See 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1. The Supreme Court has held
that there does not exist a federal constitutional right to a preliminary hearing. Lem
Woon v. Oregon, 229 U.S. 586 (1913). The vitality of this case, however, has been
questioned. See, e.g., Interest Analysis, supra note 5, at 181-83. The Supreme Court has
agreed to consider a recent federal court decision ordering a state court to hold a
preliminary hearing. Pugh v. Rainwater, 336 F. Supp. 490 (S.D. Fla. 1972), 355 F. Supp.
1286 (S.D. Fla.), aff'd, 483 F.2d 778 (5th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Gerstein v. Pugh,
94 S. Ct. 567 (1973); ci. Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 485 (1972). See also Brown
v. Fauntleroy, 442 F.2d 838 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
9. See, e.g., ARiz. R. CRIu. PRO. 19 (1956), 16 (Supp. 1972); CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 737,
860 (West 1970), § 859b (West Supp. 1973); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 276, § 38 (1968); MICH.
CoMap. LAWs ANN. § 766.1 (West 1968), § 766.4 (West Snpp. 1973); N.Y. CODE CRI. PRO.
§§ 180.10(2), 180.60, 180.80 (McKinney 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 970.02(1)(c), 970.03, 971.02
(1971).
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arrest warrant, is enough or whether a higher burden should be re-
quired, such as evidence of every element of the offense charged and
evidence which is sufficiently persuasive and credible to survive a mo-
tion for directed aquittal. A third issue is the extent to which the
accused may conduct an active defense at the preliminary examination,
viz., cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses, testify in his own behalf,
subpoena witnesses, introduce evidence in his favor, and establish
affirmative defenses. The final major issue is the role of the magistrate
who presides at the hearing in evaluating the credibility of witnesses
and weighing the evidence which has been presented.
In practice, decisionmakers have answered each of these questions
as isolated controversies without a full realization of the interrelated-
ness of the various aspects of the preliminary examination or a unify-
ing theory underlying its use. The permutations of the individual an-
swers thus rendered have led to great variety in the content of the
preliminary examinations of different jurisdictions and reflect a failure
to identify with particularity the goals and purposes of the preliminary
hearing.10
This Note seeks to formulate a comprehensive theory of the role of
the preliminary hearing in the American criminal justice system. The
theory is based on the purposes which underlie the present concern
with intolerable delay between arrest and trial. The proposals growing
out of the theory presented here will not by any means overcome all of
the problems in the present system related to excessive delay, but they
may mitigate some of the more serious effects of that delay without
incurring the great expenses likely to be associated with legislative
enforcement of a right to speedy trial. Moreover, the theory can be the
basis for an intelligent resolution of the issues inherent in the law of
preliminary hearings suggested above.
Toward these ends the Note presents two alternative conceptual
models of the preliminary hearing, neither of which is employed in its
pure form by any jurisdiction: the "forward-looking" model and the
"backward-looking" model." The "forward-looking" model, it will be
10. Indeed, the Department of Justice apparently sees little or no purpose for the
preliminary hearing and has implied that it would favor its elimination. Letter from
Deputy Attorney General Ralph R. Erickson to Senator Ervin, Oct. 3, 1973, reprinted
in 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 183-84.
11. The California and Massachusetts preliminary examinations are the closest exist-
ing approximations to the forward-looking model, while those of Arizona, Michigan,
New York, and Wisconsin embody many of its aspects. See Part I-B infra. There ap-
pears to be no rational pattern to the adoption by given jurisdictions of certain
aspects of the forward-looking preliminary examination but not of others.
In this Note, the phrases "forward-looking" and "backward-looking" will be used
in two senses: (1) the descriptive sense, in which they will refer to preliminary exami-
nations which have some, but not all, of the features of the ideal conceptual models;
(2) the theoretical sense, in which they will refer to the pure conceptual models.
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argued, is preferable because it can achieve to a limited degree the
goals underlying the right to a speedy trial. The Note will then tenta-
tively suggest that the "forward-looking" preliminary hearing be
adopted in the federal system. Since the lack of relevant empirical
information will prevent an exact calculation of the net costs, if any,
which the proposal would entail, the Note concludes only that the
potential benefits of the "forward-looking" preliminary hearing are
sufficient to justify the establishment of federal pilot projects and
further study concerning the cost and ultimate feasibility of a "forward-
looking" hearing.
I. Two Models of the Preliminary Examination as a Screen
A. The Backward-Looking Preliminary Examination
The first model of the preliminary examination will be termed the
"backward-looking" procedure. Its primary concern is with the legality
of the ariest and the validity of the detention of the arrested person;
its perspective is thus backward in time, toward the arrest. This type
of preliminary examination is designed to screen out illegal deten-
tions,12 which will be primarily of three types: first, where the arrest,
though made in good faith, was nonetheless illegal; 13 second, where
the arrest was knowingly illegal; 14 and third, where the arrest was legal
when made but subsequent events indicate that the person should no
longer be detained.1r The value of detecting these situations lies both
12. Although undoubtedly rare, there may be a difference in some cases between
the legality of the arrest (at time X) and the validity of the present detention (at
time Y, after the arrest), for example, when an informant originally gives reliable
information which forms the basis for an arrest, but which information later turns out
to be false. See M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310, 315 (D.C. App. 1971); note 19 infra;
cf. W. LAFAvE, ARREsT 408 (1965). Thus, more precisely put, the purpose of the back-
ward-looking preliminary examination is to assess the validity of the present detention
or restraint, the assessment of which depends on the existence of probable cause
at the time the examination is conducted. M.A.P. v. Ryan, supra.
13. An example of this type of arrest is an arrest based on unreliable information
given to the police at the scene of the crime.
14. Examples of this type of arrest are: (1) harassment arrests, in which the arrest
is for the purpose of annoying or humiliating a person; (2) preventive detention ar-
rests, in which the police desire to incarcerate and incapacitate a person in order to
prevent suspected future crime for which there does not exist probable cause to arrest;
(3) investigative arrests, in which the police arrest a person on a hunch or mere sus-
picion and acquire the necessary evidence during subsequent investigation, see United
States v. Quinn, 357 F. Supp. 1348, 1351-52 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Hearings on the United
States Commissioner System Before the Subcomm. on Improvements in Judicial Ma-
chinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 270 (1966) (statement
of Professor A. Kenneth Pye) [hereinafter cited as 1966 Hearings].
15. One example of this would be an arrest based on credible information given
by a previously reliable informant who later admits that the information was mistaken
or fabricated.
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in preventing further unjustified detention in the particular case"6
and in deterring illegal police conduct in the future. 17
Since the backward-looking model mandates a review of the legality
of the arrest and detention, the procedures and requirements associated
with it would be very similar to those at a proceeding before a magis-
trate to obtain an arrest warrant and very dissimilar to those employed
at a trial. The backward-looking model stresses the preliminary and
nonfinal nature of the hearing and places emphasis upon the fact that
the proceeding is not a trial but is only an initial screening mechanism
occurring very shortly after the accused has been arrested.' 8 The focus
of the inquiry would be upon the factual, as contrasted to the legal,10
guilt or innocence of the accused, just as it is when a magistrate is con-
sidering whether there is "probable cause" to issue an arrest warrant.
2 0
Given these precepts the requirements of a backward-looking pre-
liminary examination can easily be deduced. The standard for the
persuasiveness or quality of the evidence required to hold the accused
would be the same as is required to justify an arrest, i.e., probable
cause.2' The state, moreover, need not introduce evidence of every
16. See Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("the Government
must justify continued detention by a showing of probable cause"); United States v.
Quinn, 357 F. Supp. 1343, 1351 (N.D. Ga. 1973) ("the magistrate's examination stands
as a safeguard to ensure that the defendant will not be held in custody without probable
cause while the government waits to present its evidence to the grand jury").
17. See United States v. Quinn, 357 F. Supp. 1348, 1351-52 (N.D. Ga. 1973); 1966
Hearings, supra note 14, at 270 (statement of Professor A. Kenneth Pye); Alternatives,
supra note 5, at 290-91.
18. See Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1973); State v. Elling,
19 Ariz. App. 317, 318, 506 P.2d 1102, 1103, 1104 (1973); Interest Analysis, supra note
5, at 167-68, 174, 180-81.
19. See F. MILLER, supra note 5, at 94, 97-99; Preliminary Hearing in the District
of Columbia, supra note 5, at xiii, cf. Note, The Rules of Evidence as a Factor in
Probable Cause in Grand Jury Proceedings and Preliminary Examination, 1963 WASH.
U. L.Q. 102, 119-24 (1963).
The distinction between factual guilt and legal guilt refers to the difference between
those persons who are "guilty" of committing the proscribed act but are nevertheless
found "innocent" by the criminal justice system because the police, prosecutor, or ju-
diciary have violated certain of the defendant's legal rights, and those who are both
"guilty" of the proscribed act and are found "guilty" by the criminal justice system.
See Packer, Two Models of the Criminal Process, 113 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 16-17 (1964);
cf. Note, Exclusion of Incompetent Evidence from Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 72
YALE L.J. 590, 590-92 (1963).
20. See Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 306, 311-13 (1959), discussing the difference
between probable cause to arrest and guilt or innocence at trial.
21. See 18 U.S.C. § 3060(a) (1970); FED. R. CRIA. P. 5.1(a); Coleman v. Burnett, 477
F.2d 1187, 1201-02, 1204 n.96 (D.C. Cir. 1973). ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS, MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS 10 (1948), defines the requi-
site standard of probable cause as "a reasonable ground for the inference that the
charges may be well founded. . . . The proof need only be such as to afford good
reason to believe that the offense was committed and by the defendant"; cf. Adams
v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 149 (1972).
Presently, "probable cause" is the nearly universal standard as to the persuasiveness
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element of the offense charged,2 2 but must only introduce such evi-
dence as is necessary to establish probable cause. Hearsay23 and other
evidence which would be incompetent at trial, as well as illegally
obtained evidence,24 would be admissible at the preliminary examina-
tion.2 5
In addition, analogous to the ex parte proceeding for an arrest war-
rant, the rights of the accused would be narrowly circumscribed. He
would not be entitled to appointed counsel and probably would not
be permitted to have retained counsel.2 6 He would not be permitted to
introduce evidence or present witnesses in his favor, nor would he be
allowed to testify in his own behalf.2 7 Similarly, he would probably
of the evidence required to bind the accused over for trial. Indeed this is generally
true even in states which have a forward-looking preliminary examination:
Arizona: Drury v. Burr, 107 Ariz. 124, 125, 483 P.2d 539, 540 (1971); Dodd v. Boles, 88
Ariz. 401, 402, 357 P.2d 144, 145 (1960).
California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 872 (West 1970); Taylor v. Superior Court, 3 Cal. 3d
578, 582. 477 P 2d 131, 133, 91 'Cal. Rptr. 275, 277 (1970); Williams v. Superior Court,
71 Cal. 2d 1144, 458 P.2d 987, 80 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1969); Perry v. Superior Court, 57
Cal. 2d 276, 283, 368 P.2d 529, 533, 19 Cal. Rptr. 1, 5 (1962); People v. Nagle, 25
Cal. 2d 216, 222, 153 P.2d 344, 347 (1944).
Michigan: People v. Paille, 383 Mich. 621, 178 N.W.2d 465 (1970); People v. Della-
bonda, 265 Mich. 486, 251 N.W. 594 (1933).
New York: N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. §.§ 70.10(2), 180.70(1) (McKinney 1971); People v.
Jackson, 69 Misc. 2d 793, 331 N.Y.S.2d 216 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1972); People v.
Scarposi, 69 Misc. 2d 264, 329 N.Y.S.2d 850 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1972).
Wisconsin: Taylor v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 168, 172-73, 197 N.W.2d 805, 807 (1972).
But see Myers v. Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 829 (Mass. 1973); MODEL CODE OF PRE-
ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.5 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972).
22. See Williams v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1144, 458 P.2d 987, 80 Cal. Rptr.
747 (1969). But see Garabedian v. Superior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 124, 378 P.2d 590, 28
Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963); cf. People v. Jackson, 69 Misc. 2d 793, 331 N.Y.S.2d 216 (N.Y.
City Crim. Ct. 1972).
In the District of Columbia the practice is that some evidence of every element of
the offense must be presented at the preliminary examination, Preliminary Hearing in
the District of Columbia, supra note 5, at xv, xxxii, 51-57.
23. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a) and the accompanying Advisory Committee Note,
in 56 F.R.D. 143, 152-54 (1972).
24. Id. But see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(9), (10), 3504 (1970) (prohibiting the use
of evidence obtained by illegal electronic surveillance); People ex re. Pierce v. Thomas,
70 Misc. 2d 629, 334 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
25. FED. R. Evo. 1101(d)(3) (Proposed 1972) states that the rules of evidence do not
apply at the preliminary examination; this is a change from the preliminary draft,
which would have applied the rules to the preliminary examination. 46 F.R.D. 161,
417-18, 426 (1969). This provision of the Proposed Draft would not be altered by
recently proposed amendments in the House of Representatives. H.R. 5463, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess., Rule l101(d)(3), at 38 (Comm. amends. 1973); cf. Draper v. United States, 358
U.S. 307, 311-13 (1958); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 172-76 (1949), holding
that the rules of evidence do not apply to the determination of probable cause for
the purpose of making an arrest and discussing the difference between the issues of
probable cause to arrest and guilt or innocence at trial.
26. Of course, no jurisdiction could impose these aspects of the model since they
would be unconstitutional under Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). Prior to
Coleman, most jurisdictions permitted counsel to be present but did not provide for
appointed counsel. See Interest Analysis, supra note 5, at 169.
27. Most jurisdictions now allow the accused to make statements in his own behalf
and to introduce evidence in his favor, see Interest Analysis, supra note 5, at 170, 173-74,
although some states hold that the magistrate has no authority to subpoena wit-
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not be permitted to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses.28 More-
over, even if the accused had the right to testify, to introduce evidence,
or to cross-examine the state's witnesses, such rights could not be used
to establish affirmative defenses29 (although they could be exercised
to rebut the factual allegations of the state),30 since the scope of the
hearings would be narrowly confined to the factual issue of probable
cause. Finally, since the issue at the preliminary examination is only
probable cause and is not guilt or innocence as at the trial, the identity
of informers need not be disclosed at the hearing31 and prior statements
of the prosecution's witnesses would not have to be revealed to the
defense. 32
Lastly, the role of the magistrate at a backward-looking preliminary
examination would be quite limited; he would not pass upon the
nesses, id. at 170. New York allows the accused to call witnesses and present evidence
only at the discretion of the magistrate. N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 180.60(7) (McKinney
1971).
These rights of the defendant are often rendered nugatory in practice, however, by
the magistrate's adoption of a "prima facie case" rule, under which the magistrate
terminates the hearing and binds over the defendant once the state has established a
prima facie case showing probable cause. See Preliminary Hearing in the District of
Columbia, supra note 5, at 73; Note, supra note 5, at 327. Clearly, if the right of the
defendant to introduce evidence in his favor is to have any meaning, the determination
of probable cause must be based on all the evidence adduced at the preliminary
examination by either the state or the defendant. See id.; United States v. King, 482
F.2d 768, 773-76 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1204 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Myers v. Commonwealth, 298
N.E.2d 819, 825 (Mass. 1973).
28. In most jurisdictions the accused has the right to cross-examine the state's wit-
nesses who testify at the preliminary examination, although the scope of this cross-
examination is often very constricted, see, e.g., People ex rel. Pierce v. Thomas, 70
Misc. 2d 629, 334 N.Y.S.2d 666 (Sup. Ct. 1972); People v. Epps, 67 Misc. 2d 907, 325
N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct. 1971), and in some states the defendant cannot confront wit-
nesses not called at the preliminary examination by the prosecution. See, e.g., People
v. Matthews, 289 Mich. 440, 286 N.W. 675 (1939); Emery v. State, 92 Wis. 146, 65 N.W.
848 (1896).
29. Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1200-02 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (self-defense); State
v. Altman, 107 Ariz. 93, 482 P.2d 460 (1971) (entrapment); Marcum v. Sheriff, 85 Nev.
175, 451 P.2d 845 (1969) (entrapment).
Of course, the accused must be discharged if, as a matter of law, no offense has
been charged against him, United States v. Zerbst, 111 F. Supp. 807 (E.D.S.C. 1953), as
well as if no probable cause is shown, FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(b).
30. See, e.g., Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (the "federal
preliminary hearing is . . . an opportunity for the accused to rebut that showing"
of probable cause); Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (accused
at the preliminary examination may prove misidentification on the part of the com-
plaining witness).
31. Cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309-12 (1967); Rugendorf v. United States,
376 U.S. 28 (1964) (discussing the federal rule that an informer's identity need not be
disclosed at a suppression hearing); FED. R. Evn. 510(a), (c)(3) (Proposed 1972) (judge
in his discretion may order the disclosure of an informer's identity at a suppression
hearing, if he deems it necessary). But cf. Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1205-07
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
32. See Gibson v. Halleck, 254 F. Supp. 159 (D.D.C. 1966); 8 Moo's FErDAL
PaAcrtcF 5.1.02[3], at 5.1-11 (2d ed. R. Cipes 1973).
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credibility of witnesses, 33 but rather would resolve all issues of cred-
ibility in favor of the state.
34
B. The Forward-Looking Preliminary Examination
The alternative conceptual model of the preliminary examination as
a screening device is the forward-looking hearing. The primary con-
cern of this model is whether there is a sufficient probability of con-
viction at trial to warrant further proceedings 30 and those cases for
which such a probability does not exist are screened out; the perspec-
tive is forward, toward trial, rather than backward, toward the arrest.
The focus of this hearing is upon the probability of the legal, rather
than factual, guilt or innocence of the accused36 whose interests in
avoiding further unnecessary proceedings are thus protected.
37
Since under this model the perspective is toward trial and the pri-
mary concern is with the legal guilt or innocence, trial-type standards
would generally be imposed; this type of hearing would thus be more
judicial than the backward-looking model. The rules of evidence
would apply at the preliminary examination, 38 both because they are
33. See ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS, MANUAL FOR UNITED
STATES COMMISSIONERS 10 (1948). 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE 5.1.02[3], at 5.1-13
(2d ed. R. Cipes 1973), suggests that the magistrate should not get deeply involved
in the issue of credibility of witnesses.
The practice in the District of Columbia is for the magistrate to refrain from
passing upon the credibility of witnesses unless the testimony is inherently incredible.
See Preliminary Hearing in the District of Columbia, supra note 5, at xiv, 112.
The magistrate's inability to evaluate credibility renders the accused's right, if any,
to cross-examine the state's witnesses and to present evidence in his favor even less
effective; see notes 27-28 supra & pp. 782-83 infra.
34. See, e.g., Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
331 U.S. 837 (1947); United States v. Robinson, 71 F. Supp. 9, 10 (D.D.C. 1947); 8
MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 29.09[I], at 42 (2d ed. R. Cipes 1973).
35. See F. MILLER, supra note 5, at 87-88, 101-02, 348: MODEL CODE OF PRE-AR-
RAIGNMENT PROCEDURE §§ 330.1(2), 330.5 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972).
36. See note 19 supra.
37. See People v. Elliot, 54 Cal. 2d 498, 504-05, 354 P.2d 225, 229, 6 Cal. Rptr. 753,
757 (1960); Stone v. Hope, 488 P.2d 616, 619 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). See also notes
59-64 infra.
38. The rules of evidence generally apply to preliminary examinations in the
following states:
Arizona. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. AN. § 22-211 (1956); State v. Jacobson, 106 Ariz. 129,
130, 471 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1970); State v. Superior Court, 100 Ariz. 236, 241, 413 P.2d
264, 268, modified, 100 Ariz. 362, 414 P.2d 738 (1966); State v. Essman, 98 Ariz. 228,
403 P.2d 540 (1965).
California. See CAL. EvID. CODE § 300 (West 1968); CAL. PENAL CODE § 1102 (West
1970); Rogers v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 3, 8, 291 P.2d 929, 932 (1955); Pinizotto v.
Superior Court, 257 Cal. App. 2d 582, 64 Cal. Rptr. 74 (1968).
Connecticut. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-76(a) (1958).
Massachusetts. See Myers v Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1973).
Michigan. See People v. Asta, 337 Mich. 590, 610, 60 N.W.2d 472, 483 (1953).
Nevada. See Goldsmith v. Sheriff of Lyon County, 84 Nev. 295, 454 P.2d 86 (1969).
New York. See N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. §§ 60.10, 180.60(8) (McKinney 1971).
The preliminary draft of the Federal Rules of Evidence would have applied the
rules to the preliminary examination, 46 F.R.D. 161, 417-18, 426 (1969), but this was
abandoned in the proposed draft. See note 25 supra; cf. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGN-
MENT PROCEDURE § 330.4(4) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972).
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applied at the trial and because competent evidence is generally more
reliable than incompetent evidence; 39 therefore, hearsay and other in-
competent evidence would be inadmissible at the hearing. Likewise,
illegally obtained evidence would be excluded.40 The prosecution
would be required to introduce evidence (either direct or circumstan-
tial)41 which would be legally sufficient to avoid a directed acquittal
at trial: 42 evidence of every element of the offense charged 43 which
is sufficiently credible and persuasive that the jury would be allowed
to convict upon such evidence. 44
39. See C. MCCORMICK, EvIDENCE § 197 (best evidence rule); § 210, at 428 (parol evi-
dence rule); § 224, at 457-58 (hearsay rule) (1954).
40. Such evidence is excluded in preliminary examinations in the following states:
Arizona. See State v. Jacobson, 106 Ariz. 129, 130, 471 P.2d 1021, 1022 (1970).
California. See Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 815, 330 P.2d 39, 41 (1958);
Badillo v. Superior Court, 46 Cal. 2d 269, 294 P.2d 23 (1956); People v. Schuber, 71
Cal. App. 2d 773, 163 P.2d 498 (1945); Preliminary Hearings in Los Angeles, supra note
5, at 942-44.
Michigan. See People v. Walker, 385 Mich. 565, 189 N.W.2d 234.
New York. See People v. DeIorio, 45 Misc. 2d 68, 256 N.Y.S.2d 248 (Nassau Co. Ct.
1965). But see People ex rel. Pierce v. Thomas, 70 Misc. 2d 629, 334 N.Y.S.2d 666
(Sup. Ct. 1972).
See also MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAiXNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.3 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972).
41. See Coughlin v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 461, 465, 482 P.2d 211, 213, 93 Cal.
Rptr. 587, 589 (1971); State ex rel. Brill v. Spieker, 271 Wis. 237, 241, 72 N.W.2d 906,
908 (1955); State ex rel. Marachowsky v. Kerl, 258 Wis. 309, 319, 45 NW.2d 668, 672
(1951).
42. See F. MILLER, supra note 5, at 88; Myers v. Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 819,
824 (Mass. 1973); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.5 (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1972). This is the minority rule. See note 21 supra.
In State v. Smith, 138 Ala. 111, 115, 35 So. 42, 43 (1903), the court held that a de-
fendant could not be bound over based on the uncorroborated testimony of an ac-
complice when such testimony was insufficient as a matter of law to sustain a con-
viction at trial:
Why should the citizen be held to the grand jury, or indicted by the grand jury,
on testimony upon which no petit jury could possibly convict him? What good
end could be served by such a proceeding? Can there be said to be even probable
cause shown in any case by testimony which the law expressly and positively de-
clares to be insufficient to support a conviction? We think not. The whole theory
of holding accused persons to the grand jury is that the evidence before the ex-
amining magistrate or the judge on habeas corpus is sufficient to sustain a finding
of guilt by a petit jury when he shall be indicted and brought to the bar of the
court. When there is not such evidence, it is not the contemplation of the law
that the accused shall be held. To hold him would be a vain and useless thing,
involving his incarceration not as a punishment for crime and not really to the
end that he should be tried for a crime . . . [with respect to] which there is
evidence to prove [the probability of his guilt], but at the best upon a mere
speculation that evidence may be found to corroborate that of the accomplice.
43. Some states which require only a showing of probable cause nevertheless re-
quire evidence of each element of the offense charged. See State v. Abbott, 103 Ariz.
336, 442 P.2d 80 (1968); Ex parte Decker, 65 Ariz. 122, 124-27, 175 P.2d 204, 207-08
(1946); People v. Medley, 339 Mich. 486, 492, 64 N.W.2d 708, 712 (1954); People v.
Martinovich, 18 Mich. App. 253, 257-58, 170 N.W.2d 899, 901-02 (1969); People v.
Kennedy, 9 Mich. App. 346, 348, 155 N.W.2d 855, 856-57 (1968); cf. Garabedian v. Su-
perior Court, 59 Cal. 2d 124, 378 P.2d 590, 28 Cal. Rptr. 318 (1963). But cf. Williams
v. Superior Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1144, 458 P.2d 987, 80 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1969).
44. Only one jurisdiction, Massachusetts, presently imposes this strict a standard
of evidentiary sufficiency at the preliminary examination. See note 21 supra; Myers
v. Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1973). Several cases in New York formerly
mandated such a standard, People ex rel. Adler v. Bieber, 100 N.Y.S.2d 821 (N.Y. City
Magis. Ct. 1950); People ex rel. Schoen v. Bernstein, 95 N.Y.S.2d 696, 699 (N.Y. City
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In addition, the rights of the defendant at the preliminary examina-
tion would be similar to those at trial. He would have the right to
counsel and to appointed counsel. 5 He would also have the rights of
cross-examination, 46 of testifying in his own behalf, 47 and of presenting
witnesses and introducing evidence in his favor.48 The scope of inquiry
at the hearing would include matters relevant to the issue of whether
an offense was charged 49 and to the factual allegations underlying the
state's contention that the accused should be bound over.50 Moreover,
the defendant would be allowed to establish affirmative defenses, 51
either through the direct introduction of evidence or through cross-
examination. Finally, prior statements of the prosecution's witnesses
Magis. Ct. 1950); People v. Weiss, 147 Misc. 595, 261 N.Y.S. 646 (N.Y. City Magis. Ct.
1932), but the myriad of New York cases did not express a single consistent standard,
and, as indicated in the Practice Commentary accompanying the statute, the stringent
rule of Bieber, Bernstein, and lVeiss was overruled by N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 180.70
(McKinney 1971).
45. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3006, 3006A(c) (1970); FED. R. Cmat. P. 44; Coleman v. Alabama,
399 U.S. 1 (1970).
46. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1; CAL. PENAL CODE § 685 (West 1970); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 276, § 38 (1968); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.4(5) (Tent. Draft
No. 5, 1972).
47. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.4(5) (Tent. Draft No. 5,
1972).
48. See FED. R. CRIa. P. 5.1; CAL. PENAL CODE § 866 (West 1970); MAss. ANN. LAWS
ch. 276, § 38 (1968); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.4(5) (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1972).
49. See United States v. Zerbst, I11 F. Supp. 807 (E.D.S.C. 1953).
50. See Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (accused at the
preliminary examination was entitled to try to prove misidentification on the part
of the complaining witness); Jones v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 660, 483 P.2d 1241, 94
Cal. Rptr. 289 (1971) (in a rape case, defendant was released when he successfully
contested the state's claims that there was no consent); State v. Essman, 98 Ariz. 228,
403 P.2d 540 (1965) (defendant successfully contested the state's factual assertion that
the requisite mens tea existed and thereby reduced the grade of the offense).
51. See Myers v. Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 819 (Mass. 1973); People v. Uhlemann,
8 Cal. 3d 393, 503 P.2d 277, 105 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1972), rev'd on other grounds, 9 Cal.
3d 662, 511 P.2d 609, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973) (entrapment); Jennings v. Supzrior
Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 428 P.2d 304, 59 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1967) (entrapment); People v.
Garcia, 265 Cal. App. 2d 94, 71 Cal. Rptr. 102 (1968) (self-defense); People ex rel.
Schoen v. Bernstein, 95 N.Y.S.2d 696 (N.Y. City Magis. Ct. 1950) (defense of mistake
of fact rebutting a statutory presumption of intent); MODEL CODE OF PE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § 330.4(5) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972).
Clearly, the assessment by the magistrate of whether the evidence is sufficient to
bind over the accused must be based on all the evidence, including that adduced by
the defendant (either directly or through cross-examination). See United States v. King,
482 F.2d 768 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1204 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Ross v. Sirica, 380 F.2d 557, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Myers v. Commonwealth, supra at
825; State ex rel. Hanagan v. Armijo, 72 N.M. 50, 53-54, 380 P.2d 196, 198-99 (1963);
Note, supra note 5, at 327.
As a tactical matter, the defendant may not wish to introduce evidence at the pre-
liminary examination, for to do so would be to disclose his case to the prosecution.
See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 197 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Myers v.
Commonwealth, supra at 828; Jennings v. Superior Court, supra, 66 Cal. 2d at 880,
428 P.2d at 313, 59 Cal. Rptr. at 449; 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 5.1.02[3], at
5.1-12 (2d ed. R. Cipes 1973).
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would be disclosed to the defense52 and the identity of informers would
be revealed.53
At a forward-looking preliminary examination, the magistrate has a
central and active role. The magistrate can and must appraise the cred-
ibility of witnesses at the hearing 54 and must be able to dismiss the
charges if he disbelieves the prosecution's witnesses, even if their testi-
mony, if accepted, would clearly indicate a sufficient basis for binding
over the accused.55 This point is fundamental to the forward-looking
preliminary examination. Without such authority on the part of the
magistrate, the accused's right to cross-examine the state's witnesses, to
testify in his own behalf, to introduce evidence and present witnesses
in his favor, and to assert affirmative defenses would be eviscerated.56
52. Cf. People v. Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86, 90-91, 209 N.E.2d 694, 697, 262 N.Y.S.2d
65, 70 (1965) (at a suppression hearing, a witness' prior statement must be disclosed
to the defense if it "relates to the subject matter of the witness' testimony and con-
tains nothing that must be kept confidential," and this disclosure must be made ir-
respective of whether the prior statement is consistent or inconsistent with the testi-
mony at the hearing and irrespective of any assertion by the prosecutor that dis-
closure would not help the defendant nor nondisclosure harm him).
53. Cf. Coleman v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1205-07 (D.C. Cir. 1973). California ru-
quires that the identity, credibility, and source of information of an informant be
disclosed at the preliminary examination if there was a warrantless arrest or search
and if the validity of such an arrest or search depends upon the information gihen
by the informant. Compare Priestly v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 812, 330 P.2d 39
(1958); and Mitchell v. Superior Court, 50 Cal. 2d 827, 330 P.2d 48 (1958), with People
v. Keener, 55 Cal. 2d 714, 341 P.2d 587, 12 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1961).
New York imposes the same requirement at a suppression hearing. Compare People
v. Verecchio, 23 N.Y.2d 489, 245 N.E.2d 222, 297 N.Y.S.2d 573 (1969); People v.
Malinsky, 15 N.Y.2d 86. 92-96, 209 N.E.2d 694, 697-701, 262 N.Y.S.2d 65, 70-75 (1965);
and People v. Boniface, 37 App. Div. 2d 728, 323 N.Y.S.2d 876 (1971), with People
v. Cerrato, 24 N.Y.2d 1, 5-7, 246 N.E.2d 501, 503-05, 298 N.Y.S.2d 688, 691-93 (1969).
cert. denied, 397 U.S. 940 (1970); People v. Smith, 21 N.Y.2d 698, 234 N.E.2d 460, 287
N.Y.S.2d 425 (1967); People v. Coffey, 12 N Y.2d 443, 191 N.E.2d 263, 240 N.Y.S.2d 721,
modified, 13 N.Y.2d 726, 191 N.E.2d 910, 241 N.Y.S.2d 856 (1963), cert. denied, 376
U.S. 916 (1964).
Cf. State v. Lynch, 107 Ariz. 463, 489 P.2d 697 (1971) (when the complaint is on
information and belief by a person with no personal knowledge of the crime, there
is then a duty upon the magistrate at the preliminary hearing to make further in-
quiries into the source of the complainant's information and the grounds for his belief).
54. See People v. Uhlemann, 8 Cal. 3d 393, 503 P.2d 277, 105 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 511 P.2d 609, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973); Jones
v. Superior Cotrt, 4 Cal. 3d 660, 483 P.2d 1241, 94 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1971); Rideout v.
Superior Court, 67 Cal. 2d 471, 473 n.2, 432 P.2d 197, 198 n.2, 62 Cal. Rptr. 581, 582
n.2 (1967); DeMond v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 340, 345, 368 P.2d 865, 867-68, 19
Cal. Rptr. 313, 315-16 (1962); People v. Paille, 383 Mich. 621, 178 N.W.2d 465 (1970);
Preliminary Hearings in Los Angeles, supra note 5, at 703-06, 753-54, 960; MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.5(3) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972).
55. See People v. Uhlemann, 8 Cal. 3d 393, 503 P.2d 277, 105 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1972),
rev'd on other grounds, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 511 P.2d 609, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973); Jones
v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 660, 483 P.2d 1241, 94 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1971) (when the
contested issue is consent in a rape case, it is proper for the magistrate to dismiss
the charges when he believed the defendant's testimony that the prosecutrix had con-
sented and disbelieved the prosecutrix' contrary account, even though the prosecutrix'
testimony, if believed, would have been sufficient to bind over the accused).
56. See Preliminary Hearing in the District of Columbia, supra note 5, at 93-94,
99-101, 114.
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Exercise of these rights typically raises issues of credibility,-5 issues
which would be of no avail to the defendant if the magistrate were
required to assume the credibility of the state's witnesses and to accept
their testimony.58
C. Advantages of the Forward-Looking Preliminary Examination
The forward-looking preliminary examination offers to the defend-
ant, the prosecution, and the criminal justice system significant ad-
vantages over the backward-looking model.59 The primary benefit
57. No issue of credibility would be raised, of course, in the unlikely case of a
witness who admits that his testimony was mistaken or perjurious or of testimony
incredible as a matter of law.
58. See Jones v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 660, 483 P.2d 1241, 94 Cal. Rptr. 289
(1971) (see note 55 supra); Jennings v. Superior Court, 66 Cal. 2d 867, 428 P.2d 304,
59 Cal. Rptr. 440 (1967) (see note 51 supra) (affirmative defense of entrapment).
The suggestion that the magistrate appraise the credibility of witnesses can also
be justified by analogy to one of the functions of the trial judge. In ruling on a
motion for a directed acquittal, see, e.g., FED. R. CRINT. P. 29; 8 MOORE's FEDERAL
PRAcTIcE 29 (2d ed. R. Cipes 1973), which if granted would completely dismiss the
case, see United States v. Wilson, 178 F. Supp. 881, 883 (D.D.C. 1959); United States
v. Robinson, 71 F. Supp. 9, 11 (D.D.C. 1947); 8 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTIcE, supra 29.08
[I], at 29, the trial judge must view the evidence, including the credibility of wit-
nesses, in the light most favorable to the prosecution. See, e.g., Curley v. United
States, 160 F.2d 229, 232-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947); United
States v. Robinson, supra at 10; 8 MoORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra 29.09[l], at
42. On the other hand, in ruling on a motion for a new trial on the ground that
the verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the trial judge may evaluate the
credibility of witnesses and weigh the evidence, see FED. R. CRrM. P. 29; United States
v. Wilson, supra; United States v. Robinson, supra; 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTIcE, supra
29.09[l], at 42-43. While it is true that the dismissal of the charges by the magis-
trate at the preliminary hearing formally terminates the case, the same charges may
later be reinstituted. The magistrate's action is only a statement that the evidence is
prcsently insufficient, rather than a decision irreversibly precluding possible proceed-
ings in the future. See 18 U.S.C. § 3060(d) (1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(b); United
States ex rel. Rutz v. Levy, 268 U.S.'390 (1925); United States v. Cooley, 441 F.2d 1299
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 867 (1971); State v. Elling, 19 Ariz. App. 317, 506 P 2d
1102 (1973); People v. Uhlemann, 9 Cal. 3d 662, 511 P.2d 609, 108 Cal. Rptr. 657 (1973),
rev'g 8 Cal. 3d 393, 503 P.2d 277, 105 Cal. Rptr. 21 (1972); People v. Kent, 54 Ill. 2d
161, 295 N.E.2d 710 (1972); Commonwealth v. Britt, 28P N.E.2d 780, 783 (Mass. 1972);
People v. Miklovich, 375 Mich. 536, 134 N.W.2d 720 (1965); State ex rel. Beck v.
Duffy, 38 Wis. 2d' 159, 156 N.W.2d 368 (1968); Tell v. Wolke, 21 Wis. 2d 613, 124
N.W.2d 655 (1963). But cf. Wilson v. Garrett, 104 Ariz. 57, 448 P.2d 857 (1969); People
v. Beagle, 6 Cal. 3d 441, 457-58, 492 P.2d 1, 11-12, 99 Cal. Rptr. 313, 323-24 (1972);
Jones v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 660, 483 P.2d 1241, 94 Cal. Rptr. 289 (1971); Stone
v. Hope, 488 P.2d 616 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT
PROCEDURE § 330.7 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972); Preliminary Hearings in Los Angeles, supra
note 5, at 957-61.
Furthermore, the defendant's opportunity to cross-examine the state's witnesses and
the power of the magistrate to evaluate credibility will have real significance only if
the witness at the preliminary examination has first-hand knowledge of the events,
that is, if witnesses may not give hearsay evidence. It is particularly appropriate that
persons with first-hand knowledge be cross-examined by counsel for the defendant,
see Wilson v. Anderson, 335 F.2d 687, 690 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1964) (Bazelon, C.J., dis-
senting), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 927 (1965); FED. R. EVID. 1101 (Prelim. Draft 1969), and
Advisor, Committee Note, 46 F.R.D. 161, 426 (1969); C. McCoRMCK, EVMENCE § 245,
at 583.84 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
59. The forward-looking preliminary examination also serves the purpose of the
backward-looking model (determining the present legality of the arrest and detention),
since the lesser standards of the backward-looking hearing are subsumed by the more
stringent standards of the forward-looking procedure.
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would inure to the legally innocent defendant. 60 First, as a consequence
of the higher standards of the forward-looking hearing, the defendant
has a greater opportunity to escape the anxiety, humiliation, and stigma
of an unjustified public accusation and prosecution, as well as to avoid
the expense and inconvenience of the trial proceeding.0' Second, a
successful defense at a forward-looking preliminary hearing can free
the accused from an "undue and oppressive incarceration" prior to
trial.62 Third, the forward-looking preliminary hearing permits the
defendant to preserve the testimony of his witnesses and to freeze the
testimony of the prosecution witnesses, as well as to make any relevant
documentary evidence a matter of record in the preliminary hearing
transcript. 63 These three benefits to the accused are presently recog-
60. One should at the outset dispose of the contention that the criminal justice
system is properly not concerned with giving "advantages" to the accused as against
the "peace forces," i.e., the police and prosecutor. Any contention advanced in this
form misunderstands the nature of the criminal process. The issue is not giving "ad-
vantages" to either "side" in the struggle between prosecutors and defendants, but
rather the degree to which the system should avoid convicting, incarcerating, or
otherwise disturbing the innocent accused. The greater the desire to avoid disturbing
the innocent citizen, the greater the burden imposed on the "peace forces" in com-
mencing or continuing the process of disturbance. As justice Harlan noted, the
American criminal justice system is committed to the ideal that the cost of allowing
a guilty man to go free is less, arguably much less, than the cost of convicting an
innocent man. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 370-72 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). A
"benefit" to a legally innocent accused is thus in reality a reflection of the principle
that the criminal justice system tilts in favor of protecting the potentially innocent
at the cost of allowing some factually guilty persons to go free. In any event, in the
specific context of the forward-looking hearing, there seems to be no disadvantage to
the "peace forces" in ending the incarceration of an individual who cannot be proven
guilty. See State v. Smith, 138 Ala. 111, 115, 35 So. 42, 43 (1903).
61. See Jones v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 660, 667-68, 483 P.2d 1241, 1245-46, 94
Cal. Rptr. 289, 293-94 (1971); Jaffe v. Stone, 18 Cal. 2d 146, 150, 114 P.2d 335, 338
(1941); Myers v. Commonwealth, 298 N.E.2d 819, 822-25 (Mass. 1973); Thies v. State, 178
Wis. 98, 103, 198 N.W. 539, 541 (1922); Packer, supra note 19, at 41; Interest Analysis,
supra note 5, at 173, 177-78; cf. statement by Judge Frank in In re Fried, 161 F.2d 453,
458-59 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 858 (1947), on the indelibly harmful effects
of an erroneous grand jury indictment. See also P. GREENWOOD, S. WILDHORN, E. POCC o,
1%. STRUMWASSER & P. DELEON, PROSECUTION OF ADULT FELONY DEFENDANTS IN Los
ANGELES COUNTY: A POLICY PERSPECTIVE vii (Nat'l Institute of Law Enforcement & Crim-
inal Justice 1973) [hereinafter cited as P. GREENWOOD].
62. United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S. 116, 120 (1966). The most obvious incarcera-
tion is actual imprisonment, either because of the denial of bail (in murder cases or
under preventive detention schemes) or the inability to post it. See note 131 infra.
However, public accusation of criminal activity has serious consequences even on a
"free" defendant; indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized these consequences as an
"incarceration" of sorts. United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971). See also
Washington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 725, 727-28 (D.C. Cir. 1964); Thies v. State, 178 Wis.
98, 103, 189 N.W. 539, 541 (1922); Note, Preliminary Examination-Evidence and Due
Process, 15 U. KAN. L. REV. 374, 385-86 (1967); Interest Analysis, supra note 5, at 181.
63. This "benefit" of the forward-looking hearing is, of course, a product of the
original purpose of the preliminary hearing-to preserve testimony. See sources cited
note 5 supra.
The "former testimony" exception to the hearsay rule admits on the merits (as
opposed to admission for purposes of challenging a witness' credibility) at trial prior
testimony if such testimony was given at a judicial hearing by a declarant under oath,
if the declarant is presently "unavailable" to testify at trial, and if a reasonable op-
portunity for adequate cross-examination on substantially the same issues was afforded
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nized purposes underlying the speedy trial provision of the Sixth
Amendment 4 and may therefore be acknowledged as established goals
of pretrial procedure.
The forward-looking preliminary examination would also offer sev-
eral benefits to the prosecution.6 3 First, it would allow the prosecution
to test its witnesses in an adversary proceeding prior to trial, thereby
enabling it to avoid the double jeopardy proscription if its case is
shown to be then insufficient.6 Moreover, it would afford the prosecu-
tion an opportunity to record and perpetuate the testimony of its wit-
nesses while the events are recent and clearly remembered and would
operate to freeze the testimony of any witnesses who testify on behalf
of the accused. 7 Furthermore, it would offer a potential opportunity
for discovery by the prosecution if the defendant chose to present any
evidence or witnesses. Finally, the forward-looking hearing may in fact
encourage mote pleas of guilty at earlier stages in the proceedings, thus
expediting disposition of increasingly heavy caseloads.68
the opposing party in that hearing. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970); C.
MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 255, at 616, § 257, at 621, § 258, at 622 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972);
cf. id. § 260, at 625. See also CAL. EvIo. CODE §§ 1290-91 (West 1966); FED. R. Evso.
801(d)(1)(B), (C); 804(b)(1) (Proposed 1972). This rule has been applied to testimony
given at a preliminary hearing in a state with a substantially forward-looking pro-
ceeding. People v. Gibbs, 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471 (1967). Even if the
witness were available at trial, statements in the preliminary hearing transcript could
be introduced on the merits at trial in some jurisdictions as prior inconsistent state-
ments. See FED. R. Evio. 801(d)(1) (Proposed 1972); C. McCoMicK, supra, § 251, at
601-04. Finally, testimony at the preliminary hearing could be used by the defense
and prosecution to refresh the memories of their respective witnesses and to impeach
the testimony of opposing witnesses. See C. MCCORMUICK, supra, § 9, § 34, at 67, § 254,
at 615, § 620, at 624-25.
Documentary evidence made a part of the preliminary hearing record would pre-
sumably be admitted in a later proceeding by means of a certified copy of the pre-
liminary hearing record; it would be unnecessary to introduce the original or to au-
thenticate again a copy. See generally J. WIGasoRE, EVIDENCE § 1681, at 325-37 (3d ed.
Supp. 1972).
64. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 532 (1972); United States v. Marion, 404
U.S. 307, 320 (1971); Dickey v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 41-43 (1970) (Brennan, J., con-
curring); Smith v. Hooey, 393 U.S. 374, 377-78 (1969); United States v. Ewell, 383 U.S.
116, 120 (1966).
65. See Alternatives, supra note 5, at 288-89; Interest Analysis, supra note 5, at
171-73; Note, Preliminary Hearings-The Case for Revival, 39 U. COLO. L. REv. 580,
585-86 (1967); Note. The Preliminary Examination in the Federal System: A Proposal
for a Rule Change, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1416, 1419 (1968).
66. See note 58 supra.
67. See note 63 supra. There is reason to believe that this factor will be par-
ticularly advantageous to prosecutors. A recent study in the District of Columbia in-
dicated that 42 percent of prosecution dismissals result from failure of witnesses to
cooperate; better than 40 percent of these witnesses stated the reason for refusal to
cooperate was delay between the event and trial. Law Enforcement Assistance Ad-
ministration, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Jan. 26, 1974, at 2, reprinted in 14
CRm . L. REP. 2366-67 (1974). See also United States v. Carillo-Frausto, 14 CRIM. L. REP.
2376 (9th Cir. Jan. 21, 1974) (conviction overturned because of government failure to
attempt to detain material witnesses). Preservation of such witnesses' testimony at the
preliminary hearing might prevent such dismissals.
68. This controversial proposition will be discussed in more detail below. See pp. 786,
791 & 793-94 infra.
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The fonvard-looking hearing may also benefit the criminal justice
system itself. By eliminating unnecessary trial proceedings and by cen-
tralizing the myriad pretrial hearings into one complete preliminary
hearing, resources in the process as a whole might be conserved and
the congestion and delay in the judicial system might be reduced. 61
A fonrard-looking preliminary hearing could also serve as a means of
evaluating an area of pretrial procedure which has consistently eluded
rational control: the plea bargain.
70
69. This potential benefit of a forward-looking hearing will be discussed in detail
at pp. 791-95 infra. The societal interest in prompt disposition of criminal cases has
been increasingly recognized as a prime justification for the right to a speedy trial.
See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 519-20 (1972) (prompt disposition of criminal cases
is necessary to prevent commission of additional crimes while the accused is out on
bail, to prevent manipulation of the plea bargaining system, to prevent bail jumping.
to eliminate the detrimental effects on rehabilitation caused by delay between commis-
sion of the crime and the punishment, to mitigate overcrowded conditions in local
jails, and to reduce the costs of detaining the accused in a public facility); Dickey
v. Florida, 398 U.S. 30, 42 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring). See also 1973 Hearings,
supra note 1, at 1-10 (Statements of Senator Ervin).
70. See White, Proposal for Reform of Plea-Bargaining, 119 U. PA. L. REv. 439
(1971), and Note, Restructuring the Plea Bargain, 82 YALE L.J. 286 (1972), for two
intelligent discussions of the procedural inadequacies of the present plea bargaining
system arising from a failure of decisionmakers to ascertain exactly what role the
plea bargain should play in the criminal justice system. One essential role the plea
bargain presently performs is adjudication of guilt. See Note, supra, at 289; ef. Brady
v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 748 (1970) ("But the plea of guilty is more than an
admission of past conduct; it is the defendant's consent that a judgment of conviction
may be entered. ... ); FaD. R. CR1i5. P. 11 ("The court shall not enter a judgment
upon a plea of guilty unless it is satisfied that there is a factual basis for the plea.").
The major problem in connection with plea bargains is the lack of information neces-
sary to render an intelligent "adjudication." See PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCE-
MENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 11-13
(1967); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMIENT PROCEDURE § 350, Comment, at 62 (Tent.
Draft No. 5, 1972). A forward-looking hearing-could develop sufficient information as
to the defendant's alleged crime and, therefore, as to the real strength of the case
against him. This might permit the judge to evaluate rationally the fairness of the
bargain struck between the defendant and the prosecutor as an adjudication of guilt.
To the extent guilty pleas are entered after a preliminary hearing or at the close
of a preliminary hearing, the judge will thus be in a position to evaluate the bargain
and to invalidate those parts he considers contrary to the public interest; cf. United
States v. McCarthy, 394 U.S. 459 (1969); United States v. Ammidown, 42 U.S.L.W. 2296
(D.C. Cir. Nov. 16, 1973). Of course, the forward-looking preliminary hearing itself
cannot serve as a means of evaluating guilty pleas entered pursuant to a bargain
made before the preliminary hearing. See p. 791 infra. However, if the defendant
were required to plead when he comes on for the preliminary hearing (he is not
under present law; see FED. R. CRIM. P. 10), the magistrate could question the parties
at that time about the nature of the bargain, the nature of the underlying crime, and
the agreed-upon sentence, if any, much as is required of trial judges by United States
v. McCarthy, supra. Though a full-scale preliminary hearing would not be held and
the prosecution would not be required to sustain his burden of proof, the magistrate
could order further investigation or require presentation of further information as to
the crime in order to ensure that the bargain is fair as an adjudication of guilt.
Furthermore, by regulation of the plea bargain through full-scale preliminary hear-
ings or limited McCarthy hearings, the magistrate will also be in a position to review
withdrawal of charges by the prosecution, a power presently reserved to the trial
judge by FED. R. CRIAI. P. 48(a); see United States v. Ammidown, supra. This practice
will permit some review of prosecutorial discretion, the abuse of which has bcen the
subject of considerable discussion in recent years. See, e.g., Hutcherson v. United
States, 345 F.2d 964, 973-76 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (Bazelon, C.J., dissenting); Abrams, In-
ternal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1
(1971). Use of the preliminary hearing to control abuse of prosecutorial discretion would
The Function of the Preliminary Hearing
Since the forward-looking preliminary examination would provide
such substantial benefits, the issue becomes whether there are counter-
vailing costs and objections which outweigh these advantages. This
question can best be answered in the context of a particular system of
criminal justice. Therefore attention will now be directed to the fed-
eral system and the focus will be upon the changes which would be
necessary to implement the forward-looking model and upon the pos-
sible objections to its implementation.
II. Reform of the Federal Preliminary Hearing
A. The Nature of the Reforms
The present federal preliminary hearing, based on statute7 l and
rule,72 approximates the backward-looking model; indeed, the only
major element of the forward-looking hearing in the federal system is
the right to counsel. 73 Furthermore, the Constitution requires the use
of the grand jury as a regular part of the federal charging process74 and,
under present law, the existence of a grand jury indictment obviates
the requirement that a preliminary hearing be held at all. 0 Prosecutors
often take advantage of this fact and obtain a grand jury indictment
prior to the scheduled date for the preliminary hearing or before the
hearing has been completed.7 6
be similar to the proposals for a "pre-charge" or "screening" conference. See MODEL
CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 320, Comment, at 14 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972);
PRESIDENT'S CONMM'N, supra at 4-9.
71. 18 U.S.C. § 3060 (1970).
72. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c), 5.1.
73. This is mandated by Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1 (1970). Otherwise, the
federal preliminary hearing requires only a showing of probable cause, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3060(a) (1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a), which showing can be based solely on hearsay,
FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1(a), or upon illegally obtained evidence, id. But see 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2515, 2518(9), (10) (1970), which prohibit the use of evidence obtained by illegal
electronic surveillance. The identity of informers need not be disclosed at the pre-
liminary hearing, cf. McCray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300, 309-12 (1967); but cf. Coleman
v. Burnett, 477 F.2d 1187, 1205-07 (D.C. Cir. 1973), and prior statements of the prose-
cution's witnesses need not be revealed to the defense, Gibson v. Halleck, 254 F. Supp.
159 (D.D.C. 1966). The accused may cross-examine prosecution witnesses to rebut the
prosecution's factual allegations, see, e.g., Coleman v. Burnett, supra, at 1204; Wash-
ington v. Clemmer, 339 F.2d 715, 725 (D.C. Cir. 1964), but not to establish affirmative
defenses, see Coleman v. Burnett, supra. Finally, the federal magistrate, the presiding
official at the preliminary hearing, does not pass on the credibility of witnesses, but
rather resolves all issues of credibility in favor of the state, ADMINISxRATIvW OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES COURTS, MANUAL FOR UNITED STATES COMMISSIONERS 10 (1948); Cf.
8 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE 4 5.1.02[3], at 5.1-13 (2d ed. R. Cipes 1973).
74. U.S. CoNsr. amend. V. See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 6, 7.
75. 18 U.S.C. § 3060(e) (1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c). See United States v. Quinn, 357
F. Supp. 1348 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
76. See United States v. Cowan, 396 F.2d 83, 88 (2d Cir. 1968); United States v. Quinn,
357 F. Supp. 1348 (N.D. Ga. 1973); United States ex rel. Wheeler v. Flood, 269 F. Supp.
194 (E D.N.Y. 1967); 1966 Hearing, supra note 14, at 220 (statement of Professor Irving
Younger); id. at 254-55 (statement of Judge Talbot Smith).
In practice, relatively few federal preliminary examinations are actually conducted.
787
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 83: 771, 1974
The reforms necessary to recast the federal preliminary hearing into
a forward-looking preliminary hearing are essentially as follows. First,
the prosecution would have to introduce evidence of every element of
the offense charged, evidence which would be sufficiently persuasive
and credible to avoid a directed acquittal if such evidence were intro-
duced at trial.77 The rules of evidence would apply at the hearing.
Hearsay and other incompetent evidence would be inadmissible and
illegally seized evidence would be excluded.Ts The accused would be
During fiscal year 1972, only 9,554 such hearings were held, ANNUAL REPORT OF TIlE
DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE FISCAL
YEAR ENDED JUNE 30, 1972, VI-9, Table M3, at A-84 (1972), while in the district courts,
31,601 cases were commenced by indictment, 4,402 cases were started by inforniation
where indictment was waived, and 10,268 cases were otherwise begun by information,
id., Table 29, at 11-52; Table D2, at A-42; there was thus a total of 46,281 cases in
which a preliminary hearing should have been held unless waived by the defendant,
see 18 U.S.C. § 3060(b) (1970); FED. R. CRUM. P. 5(c), or obviated by the return of
a grand jury indictment. See also 1966 Hearings 220 (statement of Professor Irving
Younger); id. at 254-55 (statement of Judge Talbot Smith).
77. It is possible that this strict a standard would impose upon the prosecution a
burden which would be impossible to meet in the short time before the preliminary
examination, Interest Analysis, supra note 5, at 168 n.24. Perhaps for this reason only
one jurisdiction requires the quality of the evidence to be more persuashe than to
establish probable cause. See notes 21, 42, & 44 supra. This important part of the
model may thus prove impractical. The question, however, is unsettled, and experi-
mentation and empirical research are necessary for a resolution of the issue.
If this standard should prove unworkable, a standard greater than "probable cause"
but less than "avoidance of a directed acquittal" could be applied. See A. Goldstein,
The State and the Accused: Balance of Advantage in Criminal Procedure, 69 YALE
L.J. 1149, 1166 (1960). This intermediate standard is the "preponderance of the evi-
dence" test: There must be a stronger probability of guilt than of innocence. Some
courts have applied this standard at the preliminary examination, see Drury v. Burr,
107 Ariz. 124, 125, 483 P.2d 539, 540 (1971); Hafenstein v. Burr, 92 Ariz. 321, 376 P.2d
782 (1962); Dodd v. Boies, 88 Ariz. 401, 403-04, 357 P.2d 144, 145-46 (1960).
78. In jurisdictions which presently exclude illegally obtained evidence from the
preliminary hearing, there is a dispute over whether the defendant must still make a
motion to suppress the evidence at trial and, correspondingly, over whether the trial
judge is bound by the magistrate's ruling. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5 (West
Supp. 1973); People v. Superior Court, 275 Cal. App. 2d 49, 79 Cal. Rptr. 704 (1969);
Stone v. Hope, 488 P.2d 616, 619 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971), with State v. Jacobson, 106
Ariz. 129, 471 P.2d 1021 (1970). See also MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAICNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 330.3 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972). The better view would seem to be that of en-
dorsing the magistrate's decision as final and binding but allowing an interlocutory
appeal of that ruling to the trial judge for review of the legal conclusions but not
findings of fact of the magistrate. But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 1538.5(i) (West Supp.
1973) (trial judge hears the issue de novo); MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGN.MENT PRO-
CEDURE § 330.6 (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972); Congressional Invitation, supra note 5, at 1398-
99. Under this view the federal magistrate must be seen as an article III judge. See
Comment, An Adjudicative Role for Federal Magistrates in Civil Cases, 40 U. CI. L.
REv. 584 (1973).
The rules of evidence should be applied at a forward-looking preliminary exami-
nation for two reasons: (1) the rules of evidence are applied at trial and the forward-
looking preliminary examination is concerned with the issue of legal guilt or inno-
cence and the possibility of conviction at trial, and (2) competent evidence is generally
more reliable than incompetent evidence. See notes 38-39 supra. However, it is pos-
sible that some incompetent evidence is also reliable, at least under the circumstances
of a particular case. Therefore, if hearsay evidence is not disputed, see Preliminary
Hearing in the District of Columbia, supra note 5, at 74-75; Congressional Invitation,
supra note 5, at 1398, or if the judge finds it to be reliable, and if the prosecutor
makes a suitable offer of proof that competent evidence will be produced at trial,
then such incompetent evidence could be admitted as a substitute without contradicting
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allowed to elicit testimony through cross-examination and to introduce
evidence directly, either to rebut the prosecution's case or to establish
an affirmative defense. The identity of informers would be revealed
and prior statements of prosecution witnesses would be disclosed to the
defense. The magistrate would have the authority to evaluate the cred-
ibility of those who testify and to dismiss the charges if he disbelieves
the testimony of the prosecution's witnesses.
In addition to the above changes in the requirements and format of
the preliminary examination, two modifications should be made in the
existing federal system. First, the application of trial-type standards in
the forward-looking hearing will require that the federal magistrate
have legal training and be qualified to handle those legal issues which
will arise; the existing requirements for federal magistrates will have
to be changed.7 9 Second, a change should also be made in the existing
federal law which allows the prosecutor to avoid the preliminary ex-
amination if a grand jury indictment is obtained prior to the comple-
tion of the hearing.80
B. Objections to a Forward-Looking Federal Preliminary Examination
1. Expense and Limited Resources
One of the foremost objections to a forward-looking preliminary
hearing in the federal system is that such a hearing may well be more
expensive than the existing type of hearing and is an improvident ex-
penditure of the relatively limited resources of the criminal justice
the premises of the forward-looking model; cf. MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PRO-
crDURE § 330.4(4) (rent. Draft No. 5, 1972). Examples of the appropriate application
of such an exception to the rules of evidence include admitting certain scientific re-
ports despite the hearsay rule, see N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. §§ 180.60(8), 190.30(2) (Mc-
Kinney 1971), and allowing the hearsay testimony by affidavit of a witness who is
either unable to attend the hearing or who would be greatly inconvenienced by being
required to attend (a particularly important exception for the federal criminal justice
system, which has an expansive geographical jurisdiction; see the Dyer Act, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2311-13 (1970), hypothetical in the Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvID. 1101
(Proposed 1972), in 56 F.R.D. 183, 352 (1972)). Convenience and efficiency, however,
must not be allowed to override the substantial rights of the defendant; if the hearsay
evidence is contested and the judge is not clearly persuaded of its reliability, then the
person with personal knowledge must appear as a witness at the preliminary examination.
79. See note 73 supra. Under the forward-looking model the magistrate must have
legal training and be considered an article III judge. See Comment, supra note 78;
Wedding v. Wingo, 483 F.2d 1131 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3146 (U.S.
Jan. 21, 1974); Noorlander v. Ciccone, 14 CRIM. L. RE:'. 2329 (8th Cir. Dec. 27, 1973).
80. As will be discussed at pp. 802-04 infra, the preliminary hearing and the
grand jury are radically different institutions. The grand jury cannot alone serve the
purposes of the preliminary hearing. Both proceedings (if neither is waived) should
be required; cf. United States v. Strickland, 14 CRIM. L. REP. 2324 (D.C. Super. Dec.
20, 1973) (grand jury indictment obviates need for preliminary hearing but defendant
is entitled to grand jury testimony of major complaining witnesses).
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system. A number of factors will contribute to the increase in expense:
hiring more and legally qualified magistrates to hold the hearings;81
meeting increased prosecution and defense (to the extent the public
pays for the defense) manpower requirements in order to prepare for
and participate in the hearings; and paying the general expense of
more judicial proceedings. 82 Basic data on the expense of a preliminary
hearing in the backward-looking federal system or in the forward-
looking state systems do not appear to be available. However, the main
variables in determining any increase in expense occasioned by the
proposed reform will be the absolute increase in the number of hear-
ings actually held and the scope of those hearings.8
3
a. Guilty Pleas and Pre-Trial Strategy
If every felony defendant in the federal system were given a forward-
looking hearing in which he actually exercised all the rights available
81. See Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 347-49, 352-53 n.10, 353 n.12
(1972); S. REP. No. 371, supra note 5, at 14; Alternatives, supra note 5, at 289 n.41,
290; Interest Analysis, supra note 5, at 178. At present federal magistrates necd not
be lawyers and may serve only part-time. 28 U.S.C. §§ 631(b)(I), 633(a)(3) (1970). The
particular legal responsibilities placed upon a magistrate in the forward-looking hear-
ing, e.g., ruling on the admissibility of evidence and the burden of proof, will require
that all magistrates be qualified lawyers. See also Wedding v. Wingo, 483 F.2d 1131
(6th Cir. 1973), cert. granted, 42 U.S.L.W. 3146 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974) (suggests only an
article III judge can conduct evidentiary proceedings).
It is important to note that the additional expense resulting from changes in the num-
ber of qualifications of federal magistrates should be minimal. While the overwhelming
number of United States magistrates serve only part-time, see ANNUAL REPORT OF THE Di-
RECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS FOR FISCAL YEAR
ENDED JUNE 30, 1972, at VI-I (1972), 68.1 percent of all federal preliminary examinations
in fiscal year 1972 were conducted by full-time magistrates, id. at VI-12. More signifi-
cantly, prior to the passage of the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, 28 U.S.C. §§ 631-39
(1970), only 30 percent of the 700 United States commissioners were not lawyers, S.
REP. No. 371, supra note 5, at 10; H. REP. No. 1629, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1968);
1966 Hearings, supra note 14, at 2; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFOtCEMrtNT AND
ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 36 (1967), and, given
the congressional preference for lawyers as magistrates (S. REP. No. 371, supra at 13-14),
the percentage of legally untrained federal magistrates is probably lower than the
prior 30 percent figure.
82. These general expenses include stenographer costs, transcript costs, court employee
costs, and perhaps increased courthouse space.
The expense objection to the forward-looking hearing duplicates the expense ob-
jection to the right to a speedy trial. See, e.g., 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 119-22
(testimony of Deputy Att'y General Joseph Sneed). One must assume that if the
forward-looking hearing is adopted in the federal system, it will be accompanied by
an appropriation sufficient to meet whatever added expenses it engenders. If there
is no such appropriation, enactment of the forward-looking preliminary hearing could
cause a significant impediment in the prosecution of less important criminal cases
(prosecutors might hesitate to prosecute less important cases if they have insufficient
manpower and resources to fully explore those cases), and perhaps increase delay in
the system as a whole; cf. 1973 Hearings 127 (testimony of United States Att'y James
Thompson).
83. As the number of hearings increases the number of magistrates, prosecutors, and
defense attorneys, as well as supporting personnel, increases. As the scope of the
hearing increases the number of hours spent per hearing by the aforementioned per-
sons would necessarily increase.
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in such a hearing, the expense might well be intolerable.8 4 It is un-
likely, however, that such would occur. First, the number of guilty
pleas entered before the preliminary hearing is actually conducted, and
thus obviating the need for it, would probably approximate the num-
ber of guilty pleas entered today before trial.85 While it is possible
that forcing the prosecution to its proof might reduce the prosecutor's
bargaining position and enable the defendant to defeat a charge,so
there would seem to be substantial considerations weighing in favor
of pleading out before the preliminary hearing. Most notably, once the
prosecution has gone to the trouble of producing sufficient evidence
to avoid a directed acquittal and has generally memorialized its case,
there is very little that it can gain from withdrawing the charges
already substantially proved, except avoidance of the relatively limited
incremental expense of re-presenting the evidence at trial. Further-
more, if the defendant is factually guilty, he may wish to obtain sen-
tencing concessions by pleading early in the process.8 T If, contrary to
current practice, defendants were required to plead at the preliminary
hearing, earlier guilty pleas might be elicited.88 Second, even if the
defendant does not plead out before the hearing, he may not genuinely
contest the prosecution's case, since to do so would involve disclosing
84. Preliminary hearings are presently held in less than one-fifth of the criminal
cases commenced in federal courts. See note 76 supra.
85. Presently, the federal system, like those of the states, relies very heavily on pre-
trial disposition of cases by guilty pleas. See Letter from Deputy Attorney General
Ralph Erickson to Senator Ervin, Oct. 3, 1973, reprinted in 1973 Hearings, supra
note I, at 183, 188 (stating that 75 percent of the cases in the federal system are
disposed by means of guilty pleas). See also ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE
ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS FOR THE FISCAL YEAR ENDED JUNE
30, 1972, Table D4, at A-54; Table D7, at A-62 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 1972 ANNUAL
REPORT]; Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Compromises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty
Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. Rav. 865, 897 (1964).
86. It is unlikely, however, that a defendant would plead guilty to a charge he
could defeat at a forward-looking preliminary hearing even under the present system.
The forward-looking preliminary hearing should not, therefore, because of its in-
creased standard of proof alone, lead to a reduction in the number of guilty pleas
unkss prosecutors frightened by the prospect of increased massive workloads, unneces-
sarily adopt a particularly lenient bargaining position. See note 122 infra; cf. Note,
The Impact of Speedy Trial Provisions, 8 COLUm. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 356, 382-83 (1972).
87. See United States v. Wiley, 184 F. Supp. 679, 681 (N.D. Ill. 1960); Note, The In-
fluence of the Defendant's Plea on Judicial Determination of Sentence, 66 YALE L.J. 204,
206-07 (1956). See also P. GREENWOOD, supra note 61, at 21-23, 41-46.
88. Cf. CAL. PENAL CODE § 859 (West Supp. 1973). Presently the defendant is re-
quired to plead only at arraignment before the trial court. FED. R. CRIM. P. 10. Requir-
ing an earlier plea might encourage more pre-arraignment negotiation since the parties'
attention will be focused on the preliminary hearing as the normal date for culmination
of plea negotiations; ef. R. NIM.MER, THE OMNmUs HEARING 93-94 (1971). Since there
is no reason to assume that the forward-looking hearing will cause any absolute de-
crease in the number of guilty pleas (the real issue being when the plea is made and
thus whether a full-scale preliminary hearing need be held, see note 70 supra), if
earlier pleas are encouraged most cases which would in any event be disposed of by
guilty pleas could be concluded before the preliminary hearing.
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his case to the prosecution 9 and might be fruitless in those situations
where the outcome of the case turns, for example, on jury reaction to
identification testimony.9 0
The real picture of a system with a forward-looking hearing then is
one in which the vast majority of criminal defendants either plead out
before the preliminary hearing or do not contest the prosecution's case
at that hearing.91 The limited use, however, of the right to a full for-
ward-looking preliminary hearing in no way defeats its purpose-to
afford legally and factually innocent defendants a protection from un-
warranted charges. The limited use simply reflects the fact that legally
and factually innocent defendants are generally not subjected to un-
warranted charges.
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b. Costs Saved By the Forward-Looking Preliminary Hearing
Despite the fact that the total increase in the number and scope of
preliminary hearings under the proposed reform should not be sub-
stantial, certain increases in expense will occur and must be considered
as inherent in the proposal. These will stem largely from some limited
increases in the number and quality of magistrates and in the number
of prosecuting and defense attorneys required in pretrial procedure.
These expenses, however, may be offset by certain cost-savings which
the forward-looking hearing might effect.
One such cost-saving is that caused by the combination and unifica-
tion of the various pretrial motion hearings. Presently, a defendant is
entitled to a preliminary hearing,9 3 a hearing on a motion to suppress
illegally gathered evidence under either the Fourth or Fifth Amend-
89. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 197 (1970) (Brennan, J., dissenting); People
v. Gibbs, 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 744, 63 Cal. Rptr. 471, 475 (1967); Myers v. Common-
wealth, 298 N.E.2d 819, 828 (Mass. 1973); 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE 5.1.02[3], at
5.1-12 (2d ed. R. Cipes 1973).
90. However, not all cases which involve credibility should be processed forward to
trial since the magistrate has the authority and responsibility to evaluate the credibility
of witnesses. See p. 782 supra.
91. This conclusion is supported by the experience of California with its forward-
looking hearing. In 1965-66, California municipal courts disposed of 48,601 felony filings,
of which 16,200 involved no hearing at all because of guilty pleas or dismissed charges
and 31.896 involved limited hearings in which the defendant did not contest the prose-
cution's evidence. People v. Gibbs, 255 Cal. App. 2d 739, 743-44 n.2, 63 Cal. Rptr.
471, 475 n.2 (1967). See also ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE CALIFORNIA CouRTs, ANNUAL
REPORT FOR THE FIsCAL YEAR 1970-71, at 118, 121, 155 (1972); P. GREENWOOD, supra note
61, at 18-20.
92. The ratio of convictions to prosecutions in the federal and some state systems
is approximately 90-95 percent; most of these convictions (85-95 percent) are obtained
by pleas of guilty. See Weinberg & Vasios, A Statistical Outline, in A. Goldstein & L.
Orland, Cases & Materials on Criminal Procedure, at III-A-3 to -6 (unpublished course
materials 1972). See also P. GREENWOOD 72-73.
93. FED. R. CiM. P. 5.1.
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ments,9 4 a HWade-Stovall9" hearing 96 and, increasingly, a hearing on dis-
covery motions . 7 In a forward-looking system, all these hearings could
be consolidated and held at the time of the preliminary hearing; since
a forward-looking preliminary hearing is concerned with the legality
of evidence, such issues would come before the magistrate in the nor-
mal course of the hearing. This combination pretrial hearing held
before one magistrate would thus promote efficient allocation of judi-
cial resources and speed the flow of cases through the system.98 Further-
more, the unification of pretrial motion practice before a magistrate
would relieve the trial judge of the burden of conducting most pre-
trial proceedings.99
Second, the unification of pretrial practice in the preliminary hear-
ing and the nature of the forward-looking hearing itself may be ex-
pected to force earlier plea negotiations and ultimately an earlier plea
bargain, if one is forthcoming. 100 Since the great mass of cases in the
94. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961);
Symposium, Bail, Preventative Detention and Speedy Trial, 8 COLUM. J.L. & Soc.
PRoa. 1, 19, 20 (1971).
95. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218
(1967).
96. This hearing is held to determine the constitutional sufficiency of line-up or
other identification procedures. See United States v. King, 461 F.2d 152 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
97. See 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1970); United States v. Bryant, 439 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1971); R. NIMMER, supra note 88, at 21-24, 66-71.
98. Efficient allocation of court time and speedy disposition of cases were the main
goals of the "omnibus hearing" proposed by the American Bar Association. AMERICAN
BAR Ass'N, PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: STANDARDS RELATING
To DISCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL 135-37 (1969). See R. NIMMER, supra note
88, at 1-3, 53-71. The omnibus hearing was designed, much like the civil pretrial con-
ference, see Louisell, Discovery and Pre-Trial Under the Minnesota Rules, 36 MINN.
L. REV. 633, 660-68 (1952), to eliminate issues, promote scheduling efficiency, and re-
solve discovery controversies. See R. NIMMFR, supra at 1-3, 53-71. See also Miller, The
Omnibus Hearing-An Experiment in federal Criminal Discovery, 5 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
293 (1968). At least two states have instituted a proceeding similar to the omnibus
hearing to oversee plea negotiations. See Cahalan, Efficiency and Justice, 5 PROSECUTOR
330 (1969). The expanded preliminary hearing proposed in this Note would presumably
exercise the functions of the omnibus hearing as well as certain others. See notes 94-96
supra. Mr. Nimmer has indicated that the San Diego omnibus hearing did not speed
disposition of criminal cases. R. NIMMER, supra at 87. However, this can be traced largely
to the fact that the hearing occurs before the trial judge after arraignment and does
not involve issues upon which court time has already been spent, e.g., motions to sup-
press. Mr. Nimmer notes that discovery after arraignment delayed completion of plea
negotiations and thus lengthened the time for disposition of cases. Id. at 92. This would
rarely occur under the preliminary hearing reforms suggested herein since they ad-
vance the point of plea negotiation. Conceivably, however, defendants could demand
further discovery, e.g., of grand jury minutes, or a suppression hearing for after-
acquired evidence.
99. See Commonwealth v. Scott, 355 Mass. 471, 479, 245 N.E.2d 315, 320 (1969) (length
of time spent on pretrial hearings is "'amply demonstrative of the reason why there
is heavy and increasing congestion in the jury trials of criminal causes"); Symposium,
supra note 94. at 119-20. See also SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE AD-
IINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 10, 38-39, 44, 57-58 (1973); Comment,
supra note 78, at 585-86, 594-96.
100. See p. 791 supra for a discussion of the impact of a forward-looking hearing
on prehearing pleas. Even if prehearing pleas decrease, one could reasonably expect
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criminal justice system are concluded by a guilty plea,1' 1 this shorten-
ing of the time lapse between arrest and ultimate disposition would
reduce the expense, both social and individual, associated with delay
in the criminal process.'0 2 By ensuring that ultimate disposition occurs
in most cases before the need for a grand jury indictment arises, the
forward-looking hearing may significantly reduce the costs of grand
jury proceedings. 0 3
The stiff evidentiary standards of the forward-looking hearing may
also have cost-saving effects. First, defendants who are bound over after
a genuinely contested forward-looking preliminary hearing might be
expected to plead guilty, thus resulting in an absolute increase in the
number of guilty pleas entered.' 04 The experience in the Southern
District of New York after institution of speedy trial rules0a5 suggests
that this increase will be fostered by elimination of attrition of prose-
cution evidence as a result of delay. After imposition of speedy trial
rules in that jurisdiction there was a 20 percent increase in guilty pleas
because defendants who formerly might have relied upon such attri-
tion saw no point in delaying guilty pleas.' 0 The advantages of for-
ward-looking hearings in the preservation of evidence 0 7 would thus
that this decrease will be obviated by pleas entered immediately after the hearing, since
there would then be little reason for delaying the bargain; cf. R. NIMNSER, supra
note 88, at 66. See also 118 CONG. REC. S14,748 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1972) (Statement of
United States Attorney Whitney North Seymour, Jr.).
101. See sources cited note 85 supra.
102. See R. NIMMER, supra note 88, at 91-94; 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 141-44
(Statement of Dean Dallin H. Oaks). On the costs of delay in the criminal justice
system, see sources cited in notes 5 & 69 supra.
103. In fiscal year 1972, 31,601 federal prosecutions were begun by indictment, while
indictment was waived in 4,402 cases. 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 85, Table 29,
at 11-52; Table D2, at A-42. During this fiscal year, the per diem compensation of
grand jurors, the only cost with respect to grand jury proceedings available, was
$3,085,800, id. at 11-79 to -80. Since guilty pleas in the federal system account for 75
percent of total dispositions, see note 85 supra, the reforms suggested herein should
save substantial funds.
104. Cf. Hearings on S. 3475 and S. 945 (Federal Magistrates Act) Before the Sub-
comm. on Improvements in Judicial Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary,
89th Cong., 2d Sess. 141-42 (1967) (Statement of Prof. Samuel Dash); 1966 Hearings,
supra note 14, at 271-72 (Statement of Prof. A. Kenneth Pye); id. at 222 (Statement
of Prof. Irving Younger); Preliminary Hearings in Los Angeles, supra note 5, at 937,
948-53.
105. See 118 CONG. REc. S14,748 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1972) (Statement of United
States Attorney Whitney North Seymour, Jr.). See also Law Enforcement Assistance
Administration, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Press Release, Jan. 26, 1974, at 2, discussed note
67 supra.
106. See 118 CONG. REc. S14,748 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1972) (Statement of United
States Attorney Whitney North Seymour, Jr.). Mr. Seymour reported that the rate of
disposition after the institution of the speedy trial rules was up 20 percent, largely
because "defendants now know that they will go to trial soon, and are therefore more
inclined to enter guilty pleas than they were when they could count on a certain
amount of attrition as cases languished in file cabinets. . . . From a prosecutor's
point of view, the result was a bonanza-the conviction rate in cases which were dis-
posed of on the merits climbed from 90 percent to 95 percent."
107. See note 63 supra.
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seem to buttress the inference that such hearings may result in an abso-
lute increase in guilty pleas. At the very least, a bind-over after a genu-
inely contested preliminary hearing should result in more waivers of
grand jury indictment. 08 On the other hand, stiff standards of proof
may well eliminate charges upon which the government could not con-
vict, and thereby save the expense of a trial on those charges10° In other
cases where the ultimately guilty defendant still goes to trial, the pre-
liminary hearing transcript might be introduced at trial, by stipulation
of the parties" 0 or otherwise,"' in lieu of testimony on settled issues,
thus eliminating trial expenses and simplifying presentation of the re-
maining issues at the trial.
A final cost-savings of sorts involves the enhancement in the skill of
and participation by federal magistrates as a consequence of the pro-
posed reforms. Such a growth in skill and participation should improve
their conduct of the other duties for which they are presently respon-
sible." 2 The cost-savings which might be expected from this improve-
ment include fewer habeas petitions alleging an illegal detention,
fewer illegal incarcerations, and less time spent by trial judges on pre-
trial procedural matters."13
108. See 1966 Hearings, supra note 14, at 271 (Statement of Prof. A. Kenneth Pye).
109. More than one-third of federal and state trials in the period 1946-66 resulted
in acquittals. See Weinberg & Vasios, supra note 92, at III-A-7 to -9, 14-15. A forward-
looking preliminary hearing could screen out many of these unsuccessful prosecutions.
For an example of the type of trial an effective forward-looking hearing might avoid,
see Harris, Hogtown Justice, ROLLING STONE, Feb. 14, 1974, at 46 (the Gainesville Con-
spiracy trial of eight members of the Vietnam Veterans Against the War cost the govern-
ment $1 million in an unsuccessful prosecution).
In fiscal year 1972, there were 7,818 criminal trials in the federal district courts, of
which 2.968 were nonjury trials and 4,850 were jury trials, 1972 ANNUAL REPORT,
supra note 5, Table 43, at II-P2 (1972). The trend is toward a greater number of
criminal trials, with the number of criminal jury trials increasing more rapidly than
the number of criminal nonjury trials, id.
110. See People v. Cagle, 21 Cal. App. 3d 57, 60-61, 98 Cal. Rptr. 348, 349-50 (1971).
111. See note 63 supra. In Los Angeles County, the entire preliminary hearing
transcript is introduced into evidence in 75 percent of the trials. Preliminary Hearings
in Los Angeles, supia note 5. at 931; see also id. at 638 n.5, 648, 658 n.76, 931-39.
Both 18 U.S.C. § 3060(f) (1970), and FED. R. CRi55. P. 5.1(c) require that a verbatim
record be kept of the preliminary hearing and sound equipment has been furnished
to magistrates for this purpose. See 1972 ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 85, at IV-4. See
also MODEL CODE OF PIR-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 330.4(7) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972).
The furnishing of a tape recording instead of a written transcript of the preliminary
hearing withstood an equal protection attack in State ex rel. Moreno v. Floyd, 516
P.2d 670 (N.M. 1973). But cf. Wedding v. Wingo, 483 F.2d 1131, 1137 (6th Cir. 1973),
cert. granted, 42 U.S L.W. 3146 (U.S. Jan. 21, 1974) (phonograph recordation of habeas
corpus proceeding violates Fan. R. APP. P. 10).
112. Presently, the federal magistrates oversee the issuance of search warrants, 28
U.S.C. § 636(a) (1970), hold bail hearings, id., inform the accused of his rights at the
initial appearance, id.; FED. R. Citur. P. 5(c), assist with pretrial discovery proceedings,
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(2) (1970), provide preliminary review of prisoners' applications for
postconviction relief, id. at (b)(3), serve as special masters, id. at (b)(1), and conduct
trials involving minor offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 3401 (1970); FD. R. CRIM. P. 5(b). Congress
had indicated that it prefers that magistrates be lawyers. See S. REP. No. 371, supra
note 5, at 13-14.
113. See note 99 supra.
The Yale Law Journal
c. The Benefits Are Worth the Probable Cost
The increased expense of the forward-looking hearing and the po-
tential cost-savings it might effectuate are uncertain since there have
been no detailed empirical studies of these issues. Eliminating delay in
the criminal justice system and protecting defendants from unwarranted
charges are values of such force, however, that they should be pursued
even at significant cost." 4 Indeed, in Barker v. Wingo,"1 Justice White
in concurring was careful to point out that "crowded dockets and
prosecutorial caseloads"" 6 are not sufficient reason for excusing a pre-
sumptively prejudicial delay in trial. Thus, under principles embodied
in the Constitution itself, the nation should be prepared to spend sig-
nificant sums to make meaningful the right to a speedy trial. Surely the
nation should be prepared to spend a lesser amount to realize the same
goals in the forward-looking preliminary hearing.
2. Burden on Prosecution
Another objection to the forward-looking hearing is that such a hear-
ing will put an intolerable burden on prosecutors. This burden may
be conceptualized as follows. First, a forward-looking preliminary hear-
ing will require a prosecutor to be substantially ready for the hearing
within an unrealistically short time frame, thus interfering with the
flow of work in the prosecutor's office and seriously impairing prosecu-
tion of particularly complicated cases. Second, a corollary to the first
objection, the potential pressure on the prosecutor resulting from the
early preliminary hearing date will give leverage to defendants in plea
negotiations."1
7
These objections are not persuasive. While under the forward-looking
hearing the prosecution would have to be ready for a potentially
lengthy hearing within 20 days," 8 as indicated above only a fraction of
all criminal cases would probably go through a complete forward-
114. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 119.
115. 407 U.S. 514, 536 (1972) (White & Brennan, JJ., concurring) (five-year delay
does not violate the right to a speedy trial).
116. Id. at 537.
117. These objections have been advanced in opposition to legislative implemen.
tation of the right to a speedy trial. See Letter from Deputy Attorney General Ralph
Erickson to Senator Ervin, Oct. 3, 1973, reprinted in 1973 Hearings, supra note I,
at 183, 188; id. at 144 (Statement of Dean Dallin Oaks); id. at 132-38 (Statement of
Carol Vance, President, National District Attorneys Association); Note, supra note 86,
at 378-80.
118. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c) requires that the preliminary hearing be held within
10 days if the defendant is in custody and within 20 days if he is free on bail. Most
preliminary examinations in the federal system are held toward the end of the al-
lowable time period. See Note, Probable Cause at the Initial Appearance in Warrantless
Arrests, 45 So. CAL. L. Rav. 1128, 1132-33 (1972).
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looking hearing.119 Furthermore, if there is insufficient manpower in
a particular prosecutor's office to move the cases on to a hearing, the
solution is to hire more prosecutors. If the prosecutor has sufficient
manpower to move forward with the preliminary hearings which will
be held, the defendant should enjoy no greater bargaining position in
plea negotiations; 1 20 indeed, the prospect of virtually no bargaining
position after the prosecution is forced to put on a substantial part of
its case may move the defendant to be more willing to plead out before
the hearing.1 2 1 In sum, if the prosecution has the manpower to go to
the preliminary hearing and indicates to all potential defendants a firm
resolve to do so if there is no bargain, guilty pleas should increase and
there should be no addition to the defendant's bargaining position.'
22
There would remain, however, the problem of the particularly com-
plicated case. The impact of the preliminary hearing reforms suggested
herein may be significant but not necessarily adverse to the prosecu-
tion's interests. The requirement of an early hearing may discourage
the prosecution from arresting any of the participants in the alleged
complex crime until the case is sufficiently developed, but it is hard to
understand why that causes difficulty. This procedure is very similar to
that followed in "extraordinary" process, the process generally involved
in complicated antitrust, tax fraud, or election law cases, in which no
arrests are made until after the grand jury indictment.
23
119. See p. 791 supra.
120. This notion of insufficient prosecutorial manpower is implicit in criticisms of
proposals to implement the right to a speedy trial. See sources cited note 117 supra.
Thus, when reduced, these criticisms are mostly an expression of skepticism as to
society's willingness to pay for a better criminal justice system. See, e.g., 1973 Hearings,
supra note 1, at 119-21 (Testimony of Deputy Attorney General Joseph Sneed).
121. Cf. 118 CoNG. REC. S14,748 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1972) (Statement of United
States Attorney Whitney North Seymour, Jr.). See also Note, supra note 86, at 384,
394-95 (data which indicate that the relative stringency of various state speedy trial
provisions has no discernible effect on the quality of prosecution's preparation as re-
flected in rate of guilty pleas).
122. It should be emphasized that the greatest threat to the stability of plea ne-
gotiations in connection with institution of a forward-looking preliminary hearing is
a subjective self-fulfilling prophecy occasioned by prosecutors who fear that if they
do not immediately plead out large numbers of defendants on very lenient terms, they
will be engulfed with requests for lengthy preliminary hearings and trials. See Note,
supra note 86, at 383-85; cf. Rothblatt, Bargaining Strategy, TRIAL, May/June 1973, at 20.
If, however, the prosecution stands firm and negotiates vigorously, there is no reason to
believe that relative bargaining strengths will shift. All this, of course, assumes that any
increased costs occasioned by a forward-looking preliminary hearing are in fact met.
123. See Albrecht v. United States, 273 U.S. 1, 4 (1927); In re Presentment of Special
Grand Jury, 315 F. Supp. 662 (D. Md. 1970); FD. R. CRIM. P. 9(a); Cohen & Dession,
Inquisitorial Functions of Grand Juries, 41 YALE L.J. 687, 711-12 (1932); A. Goldstein,
supra note 77, at 1169; Note, The Grand Jury as An Investigative Body, 74 HARV. L.
REv. 590 (1961). In extraordinary process a grand jury indictment precedes arrest and
thereby eliminates the preliminary hearing altogether. If the prosecution went into
a preliminary hearing in a complicated case and failed to carry its burden of proof,
the result would be only a dismissal of the charges without prejudice. See note 58
supra. In effect, the prosecution must fully develop its case, with or without grand
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3. Burden on the Defense
A further objection to the forward-looking preliminary hearing is
that in many cases it will occur before the defense can develop an in-
telligent rebuttal of the prosecution case.124 A corollary to this argu-
ment is that any continuances beyond the present 20 day period would
delay judicial review of the arrest.125
This objection must be premised on a belief that the defense bar
will be unable to prepare for preliminary hearings in cases where the
defendant's interests demand a vigorous rebuttal and will, therefore,
be forced either to bargain before the hearing or to allow an uncon-
tested bind-over. Fear of such consequences seems largely unfounded.
Most criminal litigation does not involve extensive investigation. 12
To the extent it does, the prosecution's case is generally more carefully
prepared, and it is thus less likely in such cases that unwarranted
charges of the sort which a forward-looking preliminary hearing seeks
to eliminate would be brought. Moreover, a major cause of delays
presently requested by defense counsel is not counsel's concern about
jury subpoena power, before arresting under a forward-looking preliminary hearing
procedure; the result is similar to extraordinary process because the arrest follows the
full development and investigation of the case, rather than precedes it.
Another potential difficulty with the forward-looking preliminary hearing from the
prosecution's point of view is that it might affect the operation of the statute of
limitations. Normally the statute of limitations is tolled by a grand jury indictment.
See United States v. Garcia, 412 F.2d 999 (5th Cir. 1969). If a forward-looking hearing
causes dismissal of charges in a complicated case after a grand jury indictment and
arrest, the question arises whether the statute of limitations begins to run again.
The answer presumably is negative as long as the gand jury indictment is not "stale,"
cf. Commonwealth v. Eazer, 312 A.2d 398 (Pa. 1973), and could be used to re-arrest
at any time; cf. United States v. Wilsey, 458 F.2d 11 (9th Cir. 1972); United States v.
Zirpolo, 334 F. Supp. 756 (D.N.J. 1971). Dismissal of charges at a forward-looking
hearing does not operate to "dismiss" an indictment since the grand jury is a qualita-
tively different pretrial screen, see pp. 802-04 infra, justifying arrest on its own grounds.
See United States v. Calandra, 94 S. Ct. 613, 617-19 (1974).
All this discussion admittedly does not deal with the problem of the absconding
defendant. That problem, however, exists regardless of the form of the preliminary
hearing. The absconding accused is not irretrievably lost to the charging jurisdiction.
He may be kept under surveillance while the prosecutor builds a stronger case and
then extradited or "forcibly abducted," see Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952),
from another jurisdiction. Furthermore, if the defendant is a "fugitive from justice"
or is otherwise removed from the jurisdiction, the statute of limitations is tolled.
See Taylor v. United States, 238 F.2d 259 (D.C. Cir. 1957); Donnell v. United States,
229 F.2d 560 (5th Cir. 1956).
124. This argument has frequently been advanced in opposition to strict imple-
mentation of the right to a speedy trial. See, e.g., 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at
144-52 (Statement of Gilbert Rosenthal).
125. Prompt judicial review of arrest is a function of the present backward-looking
preliminary hearing. See United States v. Quinn, 357 F. Supp. 1348, 1351-52 (N.D.
Ga. 1973); 1966 Hearings, supra note 14, at 270 (Statement of Prof. A. Kenne h Pye).
126. Most criminal litigation involves the relatively simple issue of whether N did Y;
most investigation involves review of the prosecution's file and perhaps some inde-
pendent investigation of that evidence; cf. E. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT
xiv-xx (1932); R. NIMbsER, supra note 88, at 66-71, 84-85. Indeed, the better view is that
the preliminary hearing is the best investigation device the defense has. See A. Goldstein,
supra note 77, at 1182-83; note 89 supra.
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adequate time in which to prepare a case but rather his efforts to delay
and obtain a bargaining advantage, an interest which, in terms of the
system as a whole should be considered illicit and not deserving of
protection. 127
It is certainly not clear that the forward-looking preliminary hearing
need require more than 20 days' preparation. 28 Even if it does, the
increase in delay of review of the arrest is not a significant prejudice
to the rights of accused. First, few illegal detentions are actually dis-
covered at those preliminary hearings which are held; 29 since most
illegal detentions are screened out by other mechanisms, go undetected,
or do not occur, 13 0 little would be lost by a delay of the reviewing
mechanism. Second, the availability of pretrial release' 31 reduces the
127. See Barker v. wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 521 (1972); 118 CONG. REc. S14,748 (daily
ed. Sept. 13, 1972) (Statement of United States Attorney Whitney North Seymour, Jr.);
Anderson & Banfield, Continuances in the Cook County Criminal Courts, 35 U. CHI.
L. REV. 259, 300 (1968); Note, supra note 86, at 372-73.
128. States with forward-looking hearings require that preliminary hearings be held
within comparable time frames. See CAL. PENAL CODE 859b (West Supp. 1973) (de-
fendant has a right to a hearing within 10 days of his initial appearance, which is
termed an arraignment in California; it has not been settled whether the defendant
may consent to continuances, but any continuance can only be for a period of six
days, see id. § 861 (West 1970)); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 766.4 (Supp. 1973) (hearing
must be conducted within 12 days after the initial appearance); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§ 970.03(2) (1971) (hearing "shall be commenced within 20 days after the initial ap-
pearance . .. if the defendant has been released from custody or within 10 days if
the defendant is in custody . . ."). See also MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 276, § 38 (1968) (pre-
liminary hearing must be held "as soon as may be" after the initial appearance);
MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE § 310.5(3) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972) (hearing
must be held within 10 days if the defendant is in custody and within 30 days if
released).
129. Few charges are dismissed at preliminary hearings. See 8 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE 5.1.02[3], at 5.1-12 n.17 (2d ed. R. Cipes 1973); Preliminary Hearing in
the District of Columbia, supra note 5, at 41-45. THE PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW
ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 43
(1967), indicates that the screening function of the existing preliminary examination is
only "relevant to a small minority of cases" and is "meaningful only in a small per-
centage of the cases."
130. It is unclear which of the three possibilities enumerated in the text is respon-
sible for the infrequent dismissal of charges at federal preliminary examinations. See
A. Goldstein, supra note 77, at 1169, although it is likely that prosecutorial screening
is the most important explanation. In particular, the exercise of prosecutorial discre-
tion not to press charges, after an initial review of the case by the prosecutor, is a
major screen in the federal system. See Preliminary Hearing in the District of Columbia,
supra note 5, at x-xi, 12, 17; Congressional Invitation, supra note 5, at 1381-82. In
fiscal year 1970, for example, 38,102 federal criminal cases were commenced, while prose-
cution was declined in 89,139 investigative matters which were presented for prosecutorial
decision. See OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE
UNITED STATES, 1972, FEDERAL PROGRAMS FOR THE REDUCTION OF CRIME, SPECIAL ANALYSIS
M Table M-4, at 209 (1971). On this aspect of state criminal justice systems, see F.
MILLER, supra note 5, at 9-19, 78, 83-84, 103, 347-50; McIntyre & Lippman, supra note 5.
131. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3141, 3148 (1970); FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(c), 46; Bogomolny &
Sonnenreich, Bail Reform Act of 1966: Administrative Tail Wagging and Other Legal
Problems, 11 ARIZ. L. REV. 201 (1969); Hunter, Bail Reform Act of 1966, 40
U.M.K.C. L. REV. 295 (1972); Miller, Bail Reform Act of 1966: Need for Reform in
1969, 19 CATH. U. L. REV. 24 (1969); Note, Bail Reform Act of 1966, 53 IowA L. REV.
170 (1967).
Of course, some detrimental consequences of an illegal arrest can never be rectified,
no matter how prompt or thorough the preliminary examination, e.g., the stigma and
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urgency of very early judicial review of the legality of the continued
detention and permits attention to be focused more on dismissal of the
underlying charges than on physical freedom.
4. Comparison with the Speedy Trial Right
Another objection which might be made to the forward-looking pre-
liminary hearing is that its goals can be better realized by effective
implementation of the right to a speedy trial. 132 If all trials had to be
held within 60 days of arrest, there would be little need for so serious
a pretrial proceeding. The present judicially enforced right to a speedy
trial does not, of course, approach such a 60 day limit.133 Furthermore,
the political opposition to Senator Ervin's proposals for a mandatory
trial within 60 days of arrest suggests that legislative action is unlikely
to be forthcoming. 34 In any event, both Senator Ervin's proposals and
other proposals to decrease delay between arrest and trial have a num-
ber of loopholes which arguably permit many cases to be delayed far
beyond 60 days.' 35
humiliation of the arrest itself; the focus of any preliminary examination, however,
must be on those aspects of an illegal arrest which can be cured and particularly on
the termination of the illegal detention, for all other remediable consequences can be
handled by the cessation of incarceration. To the extent that the accused is not in
custody, therefore, it becomes less imperative that there be a prompt preliminary
examination.
This discussion does not imply that some of the conditions of pretrial release under
18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3148 (1970), are not burdensome; it is only stating that they are
less onerous than incarceration and to that extent that the need for a prompt
preliminary examination is reduced. Moreover, given the language and legislative history
of the federal system of pretrial release contained in 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146, 3148 (1970), it
was clearly the congressional intent that these more onerous conditions of release are
to be imposed only rarely. Unfortunately there is a dearth of information on this
subject. In the District of Columbia in 1970, pretrial release on personal recognizance
or other nonfinancial condition was ordered in 57 percent of the cases, while a per
centum deposit or surety bond was required in the remaining cases. See Report of
the District of Columbia Bail Agency for the Period January 1, 1970-December 31,
1970, in 1971 Hearings, supra note 1, at 581. However, the Report does not indicate
at what point in the process these pretrial releases were obtained, what the nonfinancial
conditions of release were, or what percentage of these people upon whom financial
conditions of-release were imposed were able to satisfy the conditions.
Furthermore, the remedy of habeas corpus might be employed to test the legality of
the arrest. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2; 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (1970); A. Goldstein,
supra note 77, at 1165 n.46, 1168 n.53. But see F. MILLER, supra note 5, at 60-63.
See generally R. SOKOL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS (2d ed. 1969).
132. On the various proposals to implement the right to a speedy trial beyond
its present interpretation by the courts, see sources cited note 3 supra.
133. See Note, supra note 1, at 663-65. Two particularly egregious examples are
Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972) (five-year delay does not violate the speedy
trial right); United States ex rel. Pierce v. Lane, 302 F.2d 78 (7th Cir. 1962) (18
years between conviction and new trial held not to violate right to a speedy trial).
See also Note, The Lagging Right to a Speedy Trial, 51 VA. L. R~v. 1587 (1965).
134. See 1973 Hearings, supra note 1, at 109-26 (Statement of Deputy Attorney
General Joseph Sneed expressing Department of Justice opposition to Senator Ervin's
bill); id. at 107-09 (Statement of Senator Roman Hruska).
135. See S. 754, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3161(c) (1973) (excludes from computation of
the 60 day period delays resulting from other trials involving the defendant, delays
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Moreover, the objections to a mandatory trial within 60 days of arrest,
objections which generate both political opposition and lead to loop-
holes within the proposals themselves, have considerable merit. The
primary objection is that the sanction for failure to try within 60 days
is mandatory dismissal with prejudice, arguably a sanction too severe
for the transgression. 130 A secondary objection, tied to the first, is that,
given the extreme sanction of dismissal with prejudice, 60 days is sim-
ply too short a time to prepare extremely complicated cases.137 Finally,
there is the issue of cost. It is not at all clear that implementation of
the speedy trial will result in more trials and, therefore, in signifi-
cantly increased costs, for reasons advanced earlier;13  however, even
assuming that implementation of the speedy trial right or of a forward-
looking preliminary hearing would either, individually, result in more
trials or hearings, the cost objection is more formidable in the speedy
trial context than in the forward-looking preliminary hearing context.
The combination of a backward-looking hearing and an effective speedy
trial right would be more expensive than the combination of a forward-
looking hearing and an ordinary, that is, delayed, trial if for no other
reason than the expense of juries.
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Finally, there are few benefits which the speedy trial right would
afford that could not also be afforded to some extent by a forward-
looking preliminary hearing. With respect to speedy disposition of
most cases, the preliminary hearing is superior since it will probably
induce earlier plea negotiations and bargains. Admittedly, the forward-
looking preliminary hearing cannot finally dispose of a case and thus
resulting from pretrial motions, and any period of delay resulting from a continuance
granted by the judge on the basis of a finding that "the ends of justice and the
best interest of the public as well as the defendant, would be served thereby");
Note, supra note 1, at 677-88 (discusses excluded periods under the proposed ABA
standards, the New York state speedy trial rules, and the Second Circuit Plan; all
three exclude continuances for the "ends of justice" and continuances for "exceptional
circumstances').
136. See Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 522 (1972); 1973 Hearings, supra note 1,
at 111 (Statement of Deputy Attorney General Joseph Sneed); id. at 139 (Statement of
Dean Dallin Oaks).
137. Id. at 125 (Colloquy of Senator Roman Hruska and Deputy Attorney General
Joseph Sneed).
138. See pp. 790-95 supra.
139. Two other objections to legislative imposition of the right to a speedy trial,
its effect on guilty pleas, see note 117 supra, and its burden on the defense, see note
124 supra, are also more persuasive in the speedy trial context than in the pre-
liminary hearing context. Since both prosecution and defense are faced with an ir-
revocable sanction, i.e., conviction or dismissal with prejudice, there is a greater
burden on both at trial than at a preliminary hearing where the sanction is tem-
porary, i.e., bind-over or dismissal without prejudice. Thus, there is more reason for
prosecutors to fear large-scale refusals to bargain and requests for jury trials by re-
calcitrant defendants and for defense attorneys to fear that they will not have sufficient
time to prepare certain delicate and tricky trial strategies, e.g., undermining the credibili-
ty of a prosecution identification witness. See pp. 795-99 supra.
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permit incarceration which would prevent commission of further
crimes while the accused is out on bail; it can, however, develop suffi-
cient information as to the probability of guilt of the accused 140 to
permit the magistrate to set bail which more accurately reflects the
likelihood that the accused will abscond and, in jurisdictions where it is
permitted, to justify imposition of preventive detention. A forward-
looking preliminary hearing cannot in all cases, of course, clear an in-
dividual of charges which will not prevail at trial; it can, however, re-
lieve him, at least temporarily, of charges which as a matter of law
cannot withstand a motion for directed acquittal. In conclusion, while
complete implementation of the right to a speedy trial might be more
effective in some respects than a forward-looking preliminary hearing,
its implementation is so improbable, its monetary and social costs so
high, and its incremental advantages so slight that the forward-looking
preliminary hearing seems preferable.
5. Redundancy and Relation to the Grand Jury
A further objection that may be raised is that a forward-looking pre-
liminary examination is unnecessary and redundant in a federal sys-
tem in which the grand jury is a regular part of the charging process
in felony cases' 4 ' and acts as a screening mechanism for the protection
of the accused.' 42 This objection is subject to serious dispute. First, the
gTand jury is very often a rubberstamp for the prosecutor, and there-
fore affords no protection to the accused in the overwhelming majority
of cases.' 43 Moreover, even if the grand jury process functioned prop-
erly, it would not render the forward-looking preliminary examination
140. See 18 U.S.C. § 3146(b) (1970).
141. See note 74 supra.
142. Although all states with forward-looking preliminary hearings permit felony
prosecutions to be instituted by indictment, only Massachusetts (for felonies punishable
by imprisonment for -five years or more) and New York require the use of an in-
dictment (MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 218, § 26, ch. 263, § 4 (Supp. 1973); N.Y. CoNsr. art.
I, § 6; N.Y. CODE CRIM. PRO. § 100.05 (McKinney Supp. 1972), §§ 180.10(2). 180.30
(McKinney 1971). Indictments are not regularly used in the other states with forward-
looking preliminary examinations. During the period of 1960-70, for example, grand
jury indictments were used in less than four percent of the California felony prose.
cutions. See Preliminary Hearings in Los Angeles, supra note 5, at 678.
143. See, e.g., Antell, The Modern Grand Jury: Benighted Supergoverninent, 51
A.B.A.J. 153, 154 (1965); Boudin, The Federal Grand Jury, 61 GEo. L.J. 1 (1972);
Calkins. Abolition of the Grand Jury Indictment in Illinois, 1966 U. ILL. L.F. 423. 431-32
(1966); Campbell, Delays in Criminal Cases, 55 F.R.D. 229, 253 (1972); A. Goldstein,
supra note 77, at 1171; Meshbesher, Right to Counsel Before Grand Jury, 41 F.R.D.
189 (1967); Morse, A Survey of the Grand Jury System 11, 10 ORE. L. REv. 295, 363
(1931); Shannon, The Grand Jury: True Tribunal of the People or Administrative
Agency of the Prosecutor?, 2 N. MEx. L. REV. 141, 164-66 (1972); Note, Evaluating the
Grand Jury's Role in a Dual System of Prosecution: An Iowa Case Study, 57 IowA
L. REV. 1354, 1369 (1972); Note, Should the Grand Jury Indictment Procedure be
Abolished in Illinois?, 2 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRACricE 9- PRocEDuRE 348, 354-58 (1969).
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redundant or superfluous, for the two screens are qualitatively differ-
ent, serving different purposes and having different rationales.44 The
grand jury and the preliminary examination should be viewed as in-
dependent institutions which complement and augment, rather than
duplicate, each other. Under this approach the forward-looking pre-
liminary examination is an adversarial proceeding conducted before
a judicial officer, a proceeding in which the accused is entitled to
counsel, to cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to introduce
evidence in his own behalf. The focus is on the probability of the legal
guilt or innocence of the accused and only those cases in which there is
sufficient legal basis, as determined by standards closely resembling
those at trial, are permitted to proceed.'4 5 On the other hand, the
grand jury proceeding is ex parte and nonadversarial and is conducted
by the prosecutor before a body constituted of lay people. The grand
jury is designed in theory to provide an input for lay or community
views into the criminal process at a stage prior to trial,'1 46 an input
which both provides protection against the arbitrary or oppressive utili-
zation of power by a government official (i.e., the committing mag-
istrate or the prosecutor) and allows the grand jury to express its com-
munity judgment by exercising a power of nullification to prevent a
prosecution.147 Given these disparate purposes, there is no redundancy
in employing a forward-looking preliminary examination in a jurisdic-
144. The usual view is that all pretrial screens are essentially similar and serve the
same purposes, the primary difference being the increasingly more difficult burden
placed upon the prosecution at each succeeding stage. See Goldsmith v. United States,
277 F.2d 335, 343, 345 (D.C. Cir.) (majority opinion by Burger, J.), cert. denied, 364
U.S. 863 (1960); S. REP. No. 371, supra note 5, at 34 (discussed in Congressional Invi-
tation, supra note 5, at 1379-80); A. Goldstein, supra note 77, at 1163-72.
An alternative view is that cases are screened out at the various stages of the
process "for different reasons rather than for [a] progressively more sophisticated
application of the same reason," Preliminary Hearings in Los Angeles, supra note
5, at 695, and this is the approach propounded in this Note. See also Congressional
Invitation 1379-80, 1384-86.
145. Of course, as part of his assessment of the probability of the legal guilt of
the accused, the magistrate must necessarily consider the factual claims asserted by
the prosecution. To the extent that the grand jury duplicates this factual determina-
tion, such repetition may be viewed as a check against erroneous (but nonetheless
good faith) determinations by the magistrate, an internal systemic check against human
fallibility. See Preliminary Hearings in Los Angeles, supra note 5, at 695. Moreover,
such duplication of factual determinations also exists with respect to backward-looking
preliminary examinations. This objection, if it be one, is not an objection which is
focused at the forward-looking hearing.
146. See United States v. Calandra, 94 S. Ct. 613, 617-19 (1974); Kaufman, The Grand
Jury-Its Role and Its Powers, 17 F.R.D. 331, 332, 334-35 (1955); Preliminary Hearings
in Los Angeles, supra note 5, at 681.
147. See Preliminary Hearings in Los Angeles, supra note 5, at 667. The power of
grand jury nullification is analogous to the power of nullification of the petit jury
at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). This
Note does not contend that such community input or nullification is desirable, but
only that it exists as one of the theoretical functions of the grand jury.
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tion which uses the accusatory grand jury as a regular part of its charg-
ing process in felony cases.
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Finally, even assuming arguendo both that the grand jury process is
functioning properly and that the screening purposes of the grand jury
and the preliminary examination are the same, there is still good rea-
son for instituting a forward-looking preliminary examination in the
federal system. A forward-looking preliminary examination will admit
only competent evidence, whereas a federal grand jury may consider in-
competent evidence and may return an indictment based solely on such
evidence; 149 since competent evidence is generally more reliable than
incompetent evidence, 150 the forward-looking preliminary examination
would provide a more accurate fact-finding mechanism than would the
grand jury. Moreover, the truly adversarial nature of the forward-
looking preliminary examination, before a trier who can assess cred-
ibility and weigh the evidence, will also increase the accuracy of the
fact-finding process.' 9 '
148. Given these disparate purposes, moreover, it is not nonsensical to apply a
more stringent standard at the preliminary examination than at the later grand jury
proceeding; the grand jury is a qualitatively different, as well as later, screening
procedure. It is presently unnecessary in the federal system to hold a preliminary
examination if an indictment has been returned against the accused. See p. 787
supra. This practice is based on the view that the preliminary examination and the
grand jury are equivalent screening mechanisms, see note 144 supra; congressional
Invitation, supra note 5, at 1379-80, and that the grand jury's determination that
there exists probable cause obviates the need to conduct a preliminary examination.
See United States v. Quinn, 357 F. Supp. 1348 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Congressional Invitation
1376-77, 1384-85. If the forward-looking preliminary examination were adopted, this
practice would be undesirable. It would allow circumvention by the prosecutor of the
substantial safeguards afforded the defendant by the forward-looking hearing, see
pp. 784-85 supra. It also would ignore the differences in the screening functions
of the two institutions. Every felony defendant in the federal criminal justice system
should therefore be accorded a right to a preliminary hearing irrespective of the
existence of a grand jury indictment. See MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE
§ 330.1(1) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1972); Preliminary Hearing in the District of Columbia,
supra note 5, at xxiii, xxvi-xxvii. A similar argument, based on the differences in
the screens provided by the preliminary examination and the grand jury, was re-
cently accepted in People v. Duncan, 388 Mich. 489, 201 N.W.2d 629 (1972), in which
the court held as a matter of state law that the right of a defendant to a preliminary
examination in a felony case is not mooted by an intervening grand jury indictment
between the arrest and the originally scheduled preliminary hearing. See also Stone v.
Hope, 488 P.2d 616, 618-19 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). The same proposal, but based
on the recognition of the difference in the discovery rights accorded the defendant
by a preliminary examination as compared to a grand jury proceeding, is presented
in Alternatives, supra note 5, at 295-96, and Note, The Preliminary Examination in
the Federal System: A Proposal for a Rule Change, supra note 65, at 1427-33.
149. See Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359 (1956); United States v. Payton, 363
F.2d 996, 998-99 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 993 (1966).
150. Increased reliability is one of the major purposes for many of the rules of
evidence. See C. McCoRMICK, EVIDENCE § 197 (best evidence rule), § 210, at 428 (parol
evidence rule), § 224, at 457-58 (hearsay rule) (1954).
151. It might be argued that the appropriate response is to change the procedure
used by the federal grand jury, rather than to establish a forward-looking preliminary
examination. Such a change would be inconsistent with the history and tradition of
the grand jury, see, e.g., Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 362, 363-64 (1956);
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Conclusion
In modern criminal law pretrial procedure is for most defendants the
only criminal procedure. For this reason, if no other, the criminal
justice system must pay close attention to the functioning of pretrial
procedure to insure that it is providing the protections to which all
accused persons are entitled. Furthermore, expeditious and effective
pretrial procedure protects other important social interests. The core
of pretrial procedure, in theoretical terms at the very least, is the pre-
liminary hearing, at which police and prosecutorial discretion and the
defendant's guilt are first subjected to judicial scrutiny. This Note
argues that the central role occupied by the preliminary hearing should
be openly acknowledged and further developed in the federal system.
The benefits of such development are, hopefully, a more expeditious
pretrial procedure and a just system of criminal law.
However, the costs and benefits of this development, particularly in
monetary terms, are still uncertain. An appropriate course of action at
this point, therefore, is the congressional implementation of forward-
looking preliminary hearings in a limited and geographically dispersed
number of federal district courts to provide information on the actual
impact of such reform. On the basis of that information, which this
Note forecasts will be favorable, Congress can make a thorough and
intelligent evaluation of the proper structure of pretrial procedure.
Note, Exclusion of Incompetent Evidence from Federal Grand Jury Proceedings, 72
YALE L.J. 590, 592-93 (1963), and seems unlikely, see United States v. Calandra, 94
S. Ct. 613, 617-19 (1974).
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